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Abstract 
 
Situated in the context of a rapidly aging population, this dissertation examines the 
implications of supplying long-term care (LTC) services to the elderly in the United States. The 
first two essays investigate private costs of LTC assistance borne by adult children of elderly 
parents. In contrast, the third essay focuses on the cost of publicly-provided, formal LTC 
services.  
The first essay analyzes whether adult children devote less time to exercise as time 
allocation in parental caregiving increases. The empirical model is a system of four correlated 
equations, where the dependent variables are hours spent caregiving, frequency of moderate and 
vigorous physical activity, and hours spent in paid work. I use pooled cross-sectional data from 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for this analysis. Results from joint estimation of the 
four equations indicate limited evidence of a competition between time spent in caregiving and 
frequency of physical activity. Parental factors that increase allocation of care time to parents do 
not comprehensively induce reductions in the frequency of any type of physical activity, nor in 
hours of work, among either men or women.  
The second essay goes beyond time resources and examines whether dementia onset in 
parents leads to a reduction in adult children’s household wealth. Towards this, I construct a 
longitudinal dataset from seven waves of HRS. Estimates from unconditional quantile 
regressions indicate that parental dementia substantially reduces household wealth of an 
unmarried adult child in the upper quantiles of the wealth change distribution in the first two 
years after parental diagnosis. These effects are more pronounced for unmarried adult children 
without siblings. Further, this response is observed to persist in the subsequent time period as 
well. An examination of mechanisms suggests that both, losses in labor income and nursing 
 
 
home expenditures, may play a role in leading to wealth declines. This paper makes two 
contributions: first, it focuses on a broader outcome of private cost, and second, unlike previous 
studies, it does not limit the analysis to adult children who are informal caregivers.  
The final essay examines the cost implications of publicly provided formal care services. 
Medicaid’s Personal Care Services (PCS) State Plan benefit is a key mechanism through which 
states provide personal assistance services to eligible beneficiaries. But, it is widely claimed that 
states are reluctant to adopt the program over fears of runaway spending. Surprisingly, there has 
been very little empirical work on examining the effect of the PCS State Plan benefit on 
Medicaid expenditures. Using aggregate state-level data from 1975 through 2009, this study 
finds that PCS State Plan adoption had no overall effect on Medicaid expenditures, except briefly 
during the early-growth years in 1980s. Further, findings suggest that states make decisions to 
adopt the program based on financial experiences of other adopting states. This study provides 
evidence consistent with the interpretation that when faced with the dilemma of balancing 
increased access and uncontrolled expenditures, state officials adapt the design of an entitlement 
benefit in an effort to make it less expensive.  
In its entirety, the dissertation provides new thinking on two dominant themes in 
conventional long-term care research: “caregiver burden” and “woodwork effect.” In particular, 
the results of the first and third essay question the presence of “caregiver burden” and 
“woodwork effect” respectively, while the third essay challenges the pervasiveness of “caregiver 
burden” among unmarried adult children. These findings, which in some aspect are unexpected 
in the context of existing literature, have important implications for policy intervention and the 
direction of future research efforts in this area.   
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Essay 1: Is there a Tradeoff between Parent Care and Self 
Care? 
1.1 Introduction 
As the American population continues to age rapidly, the provision of long-term care 
(LTC) for older Americans becomes an increasingly urgent issue. The current system of LTC 
relies heavily on informal—that is, unpaid—caregivers. Informal caregivers are predominantly 
middle-aged females, a majority of who are employed (Alecxih, Zeruld and Olearczyk, 2002). 
The typical care recipient, most often a parent, is also a female (Alecxih, Zeruld and Olearczyk, 
2002). This is mainly because women tend to live longer and often outlive their spouses. 
According to Donelan et al. (2002), family caregivers devote a substantial amount of time 
helping a relative: about one-third of caregivers report providing 21 or more hours of help per 
week. In addition, many caregivers provide assistance for long periods of time, with over 40 
percent having provided help for at least five years (Donelan et al., 2002). 
Numerous studies have examined the adverse effects of caregiving on the physical and 
psychological health of informal caregivers. For instance, Pinquart and Sorensen (2003) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 228 studies and concluded that studies consistently report higher 
levels of depressive symptoms and mental health problems among caregivers than among non-
caregivers. However, despite the existence of a large literature on “caregiving burden,” only a 
few studies have specifically analyzed the relationship between caregiving and leisure-time 
physical activity (Vitaliano et al., 2002; Gallant and Connell, 1997; Burton et al., 1997; Lim and 
Taylor, 2005; King and Brassington, 1997; Scharlach et al., 1997).  
Much of this work also suffers from methodological problems, including the use of non-
random samples, control groups that are matched only on the basis of a few observables, and 
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poorly-specified empirical models. There is also limited evidence in the literature on where the 
time spent in care comes from: it does not appear to have been diverted from home production 
time, and there is little agreement on whether it comes from time that was previously devoted to 
work.  
In this paper, we examine the relationship between parental caregiving and physical 
activity from a time-allocation perspective. Specifically, we ask whether a tradeoff exists 
between hours spent in informal care and the frequency of leisure-time physical activity. An 
empirical model that specifies a jointly-estimated system of four equations using pooled data 
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is used to answer this question. Given the current 
level and projected growth of informal care provision, this is an important step towards 
designing effective caregiver support programs.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the literature and 
motivations for the study. Section 1.3 discusses the methodology while Section 1.4 describes the 
data and sample. Section 1.5 presents the results and Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2 Background 
Physical activity relates to informal caregiving in at least two ways (Etkin et al., 2008). 
First, as a coping mechanism, it has the potential to buffer the impact of stressors (Howard, 
Cunningham and Rechnitzer, 1984). That is, if caregivers are engaging in physical activity, then 
the resultant stress caused by behavior and memory problems of care recipients might be better 
tolerated. Second, from a time allocation perspective, more time in care provision might mean 
less time for physical activity (Castro et al, 2002).   
Though the role of physical activity as a mediator of stress has been widely demonstrated 
(Boise, Congleton and Schmall, 2000; Castro et al., 2002), only a limited number of studies have 
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examined the impact of caregiving on physical activity. A few of these studies find that elderly 
caregivers to a spouse reported doing less exercise (Vitaliano et al., 2002), decreasing physical 
activity since becoming caregivers (Gallant and Connell, 1997), and having less time for exercise 
than same-aged married non-caregivers (Burton et al., 1997; Vitaliano et al., 2002). Other studies 
find no difference between caregivers and non-caregivers on rates of physical activity (Lim and 
Taylor, 2005) or weekly exercise (King and Brassington, 1997; Scharlach et al., 1997).  
Not only is a consensus on this topic absent, the methodology employed in many of these 
studies raises serious internal validity concerns. For instance, while some studies do not include a 
control group for non-caregivers (Gallant and Connell, 1997), others match caregivers with non-
caregivers only on the basis of a few observables, usually age and gender (Vitaliano et al., 2002, 
Burton et al., 1997). Finally, studies (e.g., Lim and Taylor, 2005; Scharlach et al., 1997) also fail 
to recognize that because caregiving and physical activity are two kinds of time-uses decided by 
the same person, it is inappropriate to model one decision as a function of the other; instead, the 
two should be viewed as jointly chosen outcomes.  
When discussing the impact of caregiving on physical activity, it is important to 
acknowledge recent evidence (termed the “healthy caregiver hypothesis”) suggesting that as high 
intensity care responsibilities increase, caregivers achieve better physical functioning because 
such responsibilities themselves may include a large physical component (Fredman et al., 2006; 
Bertrand, Fredman and Saczynski, 2006). The physical activity inherent in performing certain 
care tasks may help to improve caregivers’ physical and cognitive health. While potentially true, 
“the healthy caregiver hypothesis” does not preclude the need for leisure-time physical activity.  
Physical activity performed as a part of the caregiving process may not act as a mediator of 
caregiving stress and to the extent that stress acts as a risk factor to a caregiver’s mental and 
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physical health, leisure-time physical activity has an important role to play.  
In recognition of the overall health benefits conferred by physical activity, the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) (2008) has issued guidelines relating to minimum physical activity levels 
for children, adults and older adults. Specifically, according to the CDC, to achieve important 
health benefit, adults need at least 30 minutes of moderate physical activity (i.e., brisk walking) 
five days a week as well as muscle strengthening activities on two or more days a week. 
Alternatively, adults could also do 20 minutes of vigorous physical activity (i.e., jogging or 
running) three days a week in addition to muscle strengthening activities on two or more days a 
week to achieve the same benefits.  
If increased care responsibilities are associated with a reduced frequency of physical 
activity such that the probability that individuals engage in physical activity “multiple days a 
week” is substantially reduced, then existing caregiver support programs may need to be adjusted 
to include components that promote physical activity. Currently, the National Family Caregiver 
Support Program (NFCSP) is the key government program that provides assistance to family 
caregivers. With an overall budget of $154 million in FY 2010 (The U.S. Administration on 
Aging, Office of Budget & Finance, 2011), the main components included in the NFCSP are 
provision of counseling, support groups and respite care (Administration on Aging, 2004). If 
caregivers’ physical activity levels are falling below the recommended guidelines, the NFCSP 
might usefully be extended to include strategies that promote physical activity among caregivers. 
For example, a telephone-supervised, home-based, physical activity regimen has been 
demonstrated in past research to be one such strategy for increasing physical activity in the 
caregiving population (King and Brassington, 1997).  
In addition to the policy context discussed above, a key motivation for this study relates to 
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limitations of previous literature on caregiving and time-use. Given the time demands associated 
with caregiving, researchers have attempted to address the tradeoff between time spent in care 
activities and time spent in other activities. This work, however, has largely concentrated on 
estimating the causal relationship between caregiving and employment. Initial analyses were 
generally based on cross-sectional models of labor market participation and parental care 
(Muurinen 1986; Stone and Short 1990; White-Means 1992) but these studies failed to consider 
the endogeneity problem that arises when estimating the causal effect of informal care on work. 
Specifically, reduced-form estimates are prone to selection bias if adult children who have poor 
labor market prospects are also more likely to take on the caregiving role. 
Newer research has tried to address this endogeneity problem in a variety of ways, but, 
results from these studies have been mixed. Wolf and Soldo (1994) estimated a simultaneous 
equations model and found no reduction in married women’s employment or hours of work due 
to caregiving; Ettner (1995), in contrast, found that women’s labor supply is significantly 
reduced by co-residence with an elderly disabled parent, primarily because of withdrawal from 
the labor market. She used predictors of parents’ health status (education, age and marital status) 
and the number of siblings as instrumental variables for co-residence in a two-stage estimation. 
In a recent paper, Van Houtven, Coe and Skira (2013) examine both intensive and extensive 
margins of labor market participation. They control for time-invariant individual heterogeneity 
via fixed effects. They also control for any remaining endogeneity by using measures of parental 
health as instruments for informal caregiving. They find that care provision does not affect a 
woman’s probability of working. They also find that caregiving is associated with relatively 
moderate reduction in work hours, with large decreases concentrated mostly among high-
intensity caregivers.  
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The lack of consistent, conclusive evidence that informal care and labor supply decisions 
are negatively correlated has led some researchers to speculate that a time tradeoff may come 
from activities other than work, such as housework or leisure (Wolf and Soldo 1994). Couch, 
Daly and Wolf (1999) considered four demands on household time and money resources: time 
spent working, time spent providing care to elderly parents, time spent performing household 
work, and monetary transfers to non-coresident elderly parents. Their findings indicate that 
parental factors associated with increased time transfers to parents do not induce reductions in 
either labor market or housework time.  
The absence of negative correlations among competing time-uses suggests that there is 
scope to further disaggregate time spent in leisure activities into other “productive” uses of time 
such as physical activity. Because there are only 24 hours in a day, time for care must be found 
somewhere. This paper attempts to determine whether care time is subtracted from time that 
would have otherwise been devoted to activities relating to investment in one’s own health, 
specifically to exercise.  
1.3 Methodology 
Time allocation studies are grounded in the New Home Economics models of the 1960s. 
These models view families as engaging in production of goods much like a firm (Becker, 1965). 
Families convert time, material resource inputs, and purchased services into abstract household 
goods. In particular, Becker’s approach recognized the importance of time allocation in the 
production of household goods.  
In simple models, two activities fully accounted for time available: time in the labor market 
and time in leisure. Gronau (1977) expanded the traditional two-dimensional time allocation 
model to three uses of time: market work, leisure and home production. These categories are 
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mutually exclusive and exhaustive such that when two of the three categories are determined, the 
third is implied. The optimal time allocation by each individual depends on the value of time in 
each activity (or, the opportunity cost of that time), as well as the preferences of the individual. 
Thus an individual’s time allocation decisions are not only simultaneously determined but are 
also dependent on tastes and other unobserved variables that may be correlated across outcomes 
(Couch, Daly and Wolf, 1999).    
Following Gronau’s work, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) modeled the allocation of time 
by couples between market work and a variety of non-market activities, including home 
production, child care, hobbies and personal care. Although their model takes account of 
multiple time uses, it does not allow for cross-equation correlations between them.  
More recently, in studying mother’s time use, Kimmel and Connelly (2007) further expand 
the Gronau triad into five aggregated uses of time: (paid) market work, unpaid housework, child 
care, leisure and other (including sleep, personal care time, education, and so on). Their results 
show that mother’ caregiving time increases with the number of children, decreases with age of 
the child and increases with price of child care.  
1.3.1 Model Specification and Estimation 
As discussed above, we assume that households are productive units whose primary 
resources are time and money. Because caregiving and physical activity are two kinds of time 
use, it is theoretically indefensible to model one decision as a function of the other. Such an 
equation would not have a precise ceteris paribus interpretation because the amount of time 
devoted to both care and physical activity is decided by the same individual (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The interrelationships among time uses suggest that all factors associated with the value of time 
spent in any one activity influence decisions about all other time allocations. In this case, one 
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cannot hold time spent in caregiving fixed, because anything that influences the decision on how 
much time to spend on physical activity, simultaneously influences the decision regarding care 
hours and all other uses of time. This also rules out the existence of an exclusion variable that 
influences one category of time allocation without affecting all other types of time uses. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to model these time-use outcomes jointly. The model used in 
this paper is a system of four time-use equations where each individual’s decisions about time-
allocation are jointly determined. The outcomes in this reduced-form model are time spent in 
caregiving, the frequency of two types of physical activity (moderate and vigorous), and time 
spent in paid employment. Because the four time uses pertain to the same individual, error terms 
are assumed to be correlated across all equations. The four equations take the form: 
'
0j j j jt X         for j = care, paid employment; and 
'
0p p p pf X       for p = moderate and vigorous physical activity. 
Here, X is an array of explanatory variables common to all equations.  
These four equations are estimated jointly through a mixed-process model that included 
an “ordered Probit with known thresholds” (Lillard and Panis, 2003) for care hours1, two Probits 
for the physical-activity outcomes, and a Tobit for work hours. The joint estimation was done 
using the statistical software aML (Lillard and Panis, 2003). To account for clustering in the 
pooled data, a time-invariant, person-level random effect was included in each equation with 
correlations at the person-level across equations.   
                                                 
1 “Ordered Probit with known thresholds” is a generalized censored regression also known as “interval regression.”  
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1.4 Data  
The analysis uses data from four waves (2004-2010) of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS). The HRS is a nationally representative, biannual survey of the near elderly in the United 
States (Juster and Suzman, 1995). Persons aged 51-61 entered the sample initially, thus making 
their parents prime candidates to be care recipients. The HRS collects detailed information not 
only about the respondents and their spouses, but also important information about their parents 
and siblings. We use only four waves because questions on the frequency of various types of 
physical activity were asked for the first time in 2004.   
While the HRS employs the “recall” method to collect data on various time-uses, it is 
generally noted that time diaries (such as those collected by the American Time-Use Survey – 
ATUS) are the gold standard for measurement of time-use, mainly because they collect time 
allocation data in a structured way and involve a relatively short recall period (Van den Berg and 
Spauwen, 2006).  This gold standard is, however, not universally accepted. According to Bittman 
et al. (2004), time diaries fail to capture the real burden of caregiving and therefore can 
potentially underestimate time inputs. Self-reported hours of care may reflect supervisory time, 
i.e., a need to be “on call.” Diaries, on the other hand, are designed primarily to record activities, 
and being on call seldom shows up as an activity (Budig and Folbre, 2004).  
An additional complication is that care activity may be embedded in and absorbed into 
normal domestic activity (Wolf, 2004). For example, in time diaries, joint production of a meal 
to be consumed by both the caregiver and the care recipient is already assigned a domestic 
activity code and does not register as a specific activity associated with caregiving. In evaluating 
the accuracy of the recall method for measuring time spent in informal care, Van den Berg and 
Spauwen (2006) conclude that if one assumes that respondents take into account joint production 
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when completing the recall questionnaire, the recall method is a valid instrument to measure time 
spent on the provision of informal care. 
For these reasons and due to the fact that the ATUS does not collect data on parental need 
factors (which tend to provide key exogenous variation for time spent in care tasks), we use the 
HRS for this analysis. Any measurement error in reporting time-use due to recall or social 
desirability bias will be present in the dependent variables, which has relatively less serious 
consequences (Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001).     
1.4.1 Sample 
We focus exclusively on care provided by adult children to parents because parental 
caregiving is the most common care scenario and is also the most relevant given the middle-age 
profile of the HRS respondents. In contrast, spousal caregiving is a commonly reported care 
situation for those over 75 years of age.  
We restrict the sample to those respondents who have at the minimum, one parent alive, 
or a parent in-law alive or those who have experienced the recent death of either a parent or an 
in-law. Respondents who have experienced the death of a parent or a parent in-law since the time 
of the last interview are included because a substantial amount of care is provided at the end-of-
life stage. Further, to ensure that respondents were of working age—i.e., those for whom labor 
market participation is most relevant—we restricted the sample to individuals below age 65. 
 These sample selection criteria led to a total of 8,998 observations. After deleting 
observations with missing values (3.8%)2, a final sample size of 8,658 was achieved. Of these, 
3,892 (45%) are women and 4,766 (55%) are men.  Individuals appear in the pooled analysis file 
                                                 
2 A comparison of means between the original sample (N=8,998) and the final sample (N=8,658) revealed no 
evidence of any systematic bias due to missing data.  
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from one to four times, depending on how often they meet the inclusion criteria mentioned 
above.  
1.4.2 Dependent Variables 
The four dependent variables (Table 1-1) used in this analysis are hours of care, frequency 
of moderate and vigorous physical activity and hours spent in paid employment. Hours of care is 
only asked if the respondent provided at least 100 hours of care in assisting parents with 
Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs). ADLs 
include self-care activities such as eating, bathing, dressing, transfers and walking. The survey 
question is worded as follows: “Did you spend a total of 100 or more hours [since last interview, 
in the last two years] helping your (deceased) [parents/in-laws] with basic personal activities 
like dressing, eating, and bathing? Unlike ADLs, IADLs are not necessary for fundamental 
functioning, but they facilitate independent living in a community. Similar to the question on 
ADLs, for IADLs the HRS asks “Did you spend a total of 100 or more hours [since last 
interview] helping your (deceased) [parents/in-laws] with other things such as household 
chores, errands, transportation, etc.?” If the answer either of these questions is “yes” then the 
respondent is asked: “Roughly how many hours did you spend [since last interview, in the last 
two years] giving such assistance to your parents/in-laws?” This question is repeated, 
separately, for the spouse.  
We used a combined measure of caregiving (personal care and chores) as the dependent 
variable in the first equation. That is, the effective time (over two years) spent caring for parents 
is defined as the sum of time spent helping parents with basic personal needs and time spent 
helping parents with household chores. While some studies separate ADL and IADL care to 
account for heterogeneity of response based on the type of care, from a time allocation 
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perspective it is appropriate to combine the two because ADL care is frequently accompanied by 
IADL care, thus providing a more comprehensive measure of the total amount of time spent in 
informal care. 
As discussed in the background section, both ADL and IADL caregiving tasks may 
involve physical activity. It is important to acknowledge that there is likely to be a tremendous 
amount of heterogeneity in the degree of physical exertion involved in care tasks across 
individuals. However, from an empirical perspective, we are unable to take this heterogeneity 
into account because our data do not provide this level of detail on the nature of individual care 
scenarios. 
A sizeable proportion of the respondents who said “yes” to providing more than 100 
hours of ADL answered “don’t know” to the subsequent question on the actual number of care 
hours. This may reflect the difficulty of recalling the intensity of care efforts as much as two 
years in the past. These respondents were then asked a follow-up question that asked them to 
choose from among three possible ranges of care hours: 0-199 hours; 200-499 hours; and 500-
5000 hours.3  
Table 1-1 presents summary statistics for “hours of care” for women and men. Interval-
coded values appear as “lower” and “upper” bounds, respectively4. For those that specified a 
value for their care hours, the same value appears as a lower and upper bound. The unconditional 
(i.e., including zeros) mean for the lower bound of care hours for women is around 198 hours 
over a two year time period, while the same for the upper bound is 684 hours. Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
3 The RAND HRS family data files do provide an imputed scalar value for respondents who reported an interval 
measure for care hours. However, concerns regarding an imputed value’s accuracy become key given the wide range 
and two-year time period of the interval. For this reason, we model the interval range as the dependent variable in 
the care-hours equation. As compared to imputed data, using intervals leads to larger variances, thus yielding tests of 
significance that are generally more conservative.   
4 Observations reporting zero care hours are coded as falling into the –∞, 0 interval as “ordered Probit with known 
thresholds” is a generalized Tobit estimation.  
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these numbers are much higher for women than men, suggesting that women provide more hours 
of care, in general. Also, as expected, for caregivers5 (42% among women and 36% among men), 
the mean values for both the lower and upper bounds are considerably higher than those for the 
entire sample of women and men (unconditional means).  
With regard to the frequency of different types of physical activity, the HRS asks 
respondents how often they engage in three kinds of physical activity – mild, moderate and 
vigorous. Because the CDC guidelines are limited to only moderate and vigorous physical 
activity, we don’t include mild physical activity in our analysis.  
 For vigorous physical activity, the HRS asks, “How often do you take part in sports or 
activities that are vigorous such as running or jogging, swimming, cycling, aerobic or a gym 
workout?” Similarly, for moderate physical activity, the HRS asks respondents, “How often do 
you take part in sports or activities that are moderately energetic such as, brisk walking, 
gardening, cleaning the car, dancing, floor or stretching exercises? The response categories for 
both questions are “hardly ever or never,” “one to three times a month,” “once a week,” and 
“more than once a week/every day.” Given the inherently physical nature of many care tasks, 
there might be concern that some respondents think of caregiving as physical activity. However, 
because the description of the questions contain explicit examples, it is unlikely that individuals 
included care tasks in their responses on physical activity participation.   
In a further effort to keep the analysis relevant to CDC guidelines, we created 
dichotomous variables expressing physical activity frequency as either “multiple times a week” 
or “less than multiple times a week” for both moderate and vigorous physical activity. Table 1-1 
demonstrates that approximately 56% of women and 60% of men report doing moderate physical 
                                                 
5 Those with positive ADL or IADL care hours 
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activity “multiple times a week.” In contrast, only 25% of women and 33% of men report doing 
vigorous physical activity “multiple times a week.” It is not surprising that a higher percentage of 
men and women frequently perform moderate physical activity. In addition to being physically 
more strenuous, vigorous activity also entails a higher investment on the part of an individual. 
For example, while one can do stretching exercises (an example of moderate physical activity) in 
the confines of his/her residence, an aerobic workout or a swim (examples of vigorous physical 
activity) will entail a gym membership, special attire and other sports gear. Thus, even from a 
non-physical perspective, engaging in moderate physical activity is relatively more feasible. In 
general, the descriptive statistics also show that men are likely to engage in both types of 
physical activity more frequently than women. 
The hours of work variable is taken from the RAND HRS (2011) data files. It is the sum 
of the typical number of hours per week the respondent works at the main job and at a secondary 
job, if any. If the respondent is not working, the hours of work are coded to zero. Table 1-1 shows 
substantial differences between the unconditional and conditional means for employment hours. 
This is because 39% of women and 29% of men do not work. When everyone is included, the 
mean hours spent in paid employment are about 23 hours per week for women and 32 hours per 
week for men; when considering only those who are employed, the mean hours spent in paid 
employment are around 38 hours per week for women and 45 hours per week for men.  
1.4.3 Independent Variables 
The explanatory variables (summarized in Table 1-1) include characteristics of parental 
health and need, Pi, the respondent’s individual and demographic characteristics, Zi, 
characteristics of respondent’s health, Hi, and characteristics of the respondent’s household, Di.    
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The vector Pi represents the key explanatory variables, those that measure parental health 
status. Separate indicators for mother, father, mother in-law and father in-law are included in the 
regression analyses. As parental health declines, hours of care are hypothesized to increase and 
frequency of physical activity is expected to decrease. It is also expected that as parental health 
declines, hours of work should also decrease. These variables include a dummy variable for 
whether the parent can be left alone for an hour (coded as 1 if the parent cannot be left alone for 
an hour) and another indicating whether the parent has ADL needs. Almost all respondents who 
said “yes” to whether parents cannot be left alone for an hour also reported parents having ADL 
needs.  To avoid overlap, the measure for whether parent has ADL need excludes those who said 
“yes” to whether parents cannot be left alone for an hour; thus the “ADL needs” variable 
represents needs beyond any revealed by the “cannot be left alone” variable. 
We also control for parents’ marital status. If parents are married (whether to each other 
or otherwise), then the adult child is less likely to provide care due to the availability of an 
alternate caregiver, the parent’s spouse. The three “need” indicators discussed above (including 
parent’s marital status) pertain only to parents alive at the time of the interview. 
Finally, for those individuals whose parents died recently (i.e., since the last interview), 
we include two variables that indicate whether the parent died due to an illness lasting three 
months or more; and whether the parent died without an illness lasting three months or more. 
Because the period before death is likely to characterize a significant need for care regardless of 
cause, we expect both variables to positively predict care hours. That said, we hypothesize that 
death due to an illness would lead to a higher increase in care hours as compared to death 
without an illness. Similarly, we expect that death with an illness would lead to a larger decrease 
in the frequency of physical activity and hours of work (if any) as compared to death without an 
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illness. Disaggregating parent’s recent death by cause allows us to examine how different levels 
of parental need influence various time allocation decisions.  
As depicted in Table 1-1, almost 60% of the women have a living mother, while only 24% 
have a living father. Though the numbers are smaller for men, the trend is similar. Not only are 
more mothers alive than fathers, mothers are also more likely to require care:  while 7% of the 
women report that their mothers “cannot be left alone for an hour,” only 2% of the women report 
that their fathers “cannot be left alone for an hour.” Similarly, even among men, while 7% report 
their mothers have “ADL needs”, only 3% report that their fathers have “ADL needs”.  
The vector Zi includes the respondent’s age, education, race, marital status, number of 
siblings (number of sisters and number of brothers separately), the natural log of hourly wage 
and wealth. The mean age for women and men is 58 and 59 years, respectively. Approximately 
78% of women and 84% of men are white. Further, a large majority of both men and women are 
married or living together.  
As discussed above, for a large percentage of individuals in the sample—those not 
presently working—the hourly wage rate is missing. Because this is suggestive of selection bias, 
we predict wages for the entire sample (men and women together) using a two-step, Heckman 
estimation procedure (results available on request). Variables included in the reduced form 
employment equation that are not included in the log-wage equation include measures of 
parental need, spousal need, respondent health and marital status. Age, education, experience, a 
second order term for experience and gender are included in the wage equation6.  
In the first stage estimation, several of the identifying variables, including spousal need 
and some measures of parental health are significant predictors of employment. In addition, the 
                                                 
6 To check for wage penalties, we included parental need variables in one specification of the wage equation. We 
found no statistically significant evidence of reduced wages as a result of poor parental health.  
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F-test of the wage equation estimation is also significant at 0.01 level, indicating that all the 
included variables contribute to the prediction of wage levels.  After the second stage, selectivity 
corrected, predicted log wage is imputed for all respondents. As expected, the mean predicted 
log wage is higher for men than women.  
We also control for non-housing financial wealth. This includes the sum of appropriate 
wealth components (such as savings, checking, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and Treasury Bills) 
minus debt. This measure is taken from the RAND version of the HRS. Because the RAND 
version of the HRS imputes values for those who either gave no response or an interval response, 
there were no missing observations. 
The vector Hi includes plausibly exogenous variables that determine a respondent’s 
health status. Health status is likely to have an effect on how the respondent decides to allocate 
his or her time. Hi, consists of two indicator variables: whether the respondent ever smoked 
(specifically, smoked 100 cigarettes or more in their lifetime), and a lagged measure (from the 
previous wave of the HRS) of the respondent’s Body Mass Index (BMI). Other health status 
variables in the HRS, for example self-reported physical and mental health status, are not 
included because they may be simultaneously determined along with the dependent variables and 
thus may be subject to endogeneity bias.  
Finally, household characteristics, Di, include indicator variables for spouse’s health, the 
number of co-resident children under 18 years of age, spouse’s age, number of spouse’s siblings 
and spouse’s work experience. Spousal health characteristics and the number of co-resident 
children are intended to capture intra-household demands on an individual’s time. With 
deteriorating spousal health, we expect that an individual’s time allocation in parent care, 
physical activity and work will compete with his/her time allocation in spousal care. We use 
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spouse’s ADL needs (as measured by the sum of five possible ADL limitations) to control for 
spousal health. Similarly, time allocation in any non-childcare related activity may also decrease 
as the number of children under 18 years of age in the household increase.   
It is important to recognize that among married individuals, the decision regarding time 
transfers to parents or parents-in-law is taken in a household context. For example, spousal time 
allocation in parental care is a key predictor of the respondent’s time allocation in the same task. 
From a modelling perspective, however, explicitly controlling for the amount of time the spouse 
spends in various activities creates an endogeneity problem. Therefore, in order to represent this 
intra-household decision making context, we include certain exogenous variables that are likely 
to directly influence spouse’s time allocation decisions.  These variables include spouse’s age, 
spouse’ work experience and spouse’s siblings (number of sisters and number of brothers 
separately). The control for spousal health described above is an additional control for this intra-
household decision making context. Note, for those individuals who don’t have a spouse, these 
variables are coded to zero.   
1.5 Results 
Table 1-2 and Table 1-3 (for women and men respectively) present the estimated 
marginal effects on the unconditional expected value of hours spent in caregiving, predicted 
probabilities of engaging in moderate and vigorous physical activity multiple times a week, and 
unconditional expected value of hours spent in employment. Marginal effects are slopes for 
continuous explanatory variables (e.g., wage rates) or discrete changes in the outcome variable 
for dummy-coded explanatory variables (e.g., mom has ADL needs). All standard errors are 
Huber-corrected.   
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1.5.1 Parental Need 
As expected, care hours respond positively to almost all parental need characteristics. 
Having a mother or father who cannot be left alone for one hour, or requires help in completing 
ADL tasks all lead to significant increases in care hours. For instance, among women, having a 
mother who cannot be left alone for an hour increases average care hours by 214 hours over a 
two-year period. Among men, having a father who cannot be left alone for an hour increases 
average care hours by 114 hours over a two year period. Further, as expected, experiencing a 
recent death of a parent due to an illness leads to a greater increase in care hours as compared to 
a recent death of a parent without an illness. For example, among women, having had a mother 
who died recently with an illness increases care hours by 265 hours over a two year period, but 
in contrast, having had a mother who died without an illness increases care hours by a lesser 
amount -- 187 hours. We find similar results among men.  
The results suggest that women’s increases in time allocated to caregiving in response to 
parental needs are larger than men’s. In addition, as demonstrated in the literature previously 
(Lee, 1993), there is evidence of same-gender preferences: women are likely to increase care 
hours more in response to their mother’s physical needs than to their father’s. Similarly, men are 
likely to increase their care hours more in respect to father’s health needs as opposed to the 
mother’s.  
Overall, there is limited support for the existence of a time conflict between hours of care 
and frequency of physical exercise. The results demonstrate that even though most parental need 
characteristics positively predict hours of care; they do not comprehensively predict 
compensatory decreases in the frequency of physical activity.  
Among women, having a father who needs help with ADL tasks increased the number of 
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care hours over a two year period by 161 hours and reduced the frequency of engaging in 
vigorous physical activity multiple times a week by 10%. There is some indication that having a 
father who died without an illness – a type of parental need that is relatively less severe due to its 
presumably shorter length – led to an increase in the probability of frequent participation in 
physical activity. However, it is not entirely clear how having had a father who died without an 
illness affects care hours – for both men and women, this variable increases care hours by only a 
very small and statistically insignificant number. Finally, among women, having a mother who is 
married increased the probability of engaging in moderate physical activity multiple times a 
week by 10%. The mother’s marital status negatively predicts care hours, though again, the 
estimate is not statistically significant. None of the other parental need variables predicted a 
statically significant tradeoff between care and physical activity among either men or women.   
Interestingly, among men, the estimated correlations of unobservables between time spent 
in caregiving and the two types of physical activity are positive (see “Rho – Care” bottom of  
Table 1-3). This suggests that among men, after controlling for parental need and other 
variables, unobservable factors influence time allocation in caregiving and physical activity in 
the same direction. Some of these unobservables may include self-efficacy, beliefs regarding 
quality of life and health, and so on. Further, it is also likely that better mental health, which we 
don’t include in the regressions as it is almost certainly endogenous, positively predicts both the 
amount of care time and frequency of physical activity. The estimated correlations between care 
and physical activity are positive, but small and statistically insignificant among women.  
Focusing on another type of time conflict, that between care hours and work hours, the 
results demonstrate that among men, having a mother who cannot be left alone for an hour 
negatively influences hours of work. Specifically, having a mother with intensive care needs 
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reduces average work hours by close to four hours per week. The corresponding result for 
women is also negative but statistically insignificant. Similarly, facing a non-illness related death 
of a mother in the last two years is associated with an increase in work hours for both men and 
women.  As discussed previously, the literature has yet to reach a general agreement on the effect 
of informal care provision on labor force participation. Our results are somewhat consistent with 
recent evidence from the U.S. suggesting that personal care assistance reduces the probability of 
working among men and leads women who are working to reduce work hours (Van Houtven, 
Coe and Skira, 2013). It is possible that we achieve imprecise estimates for women because 
almost 40% of the women in our sample do not work.   
With regard to error correlations, among both women and men, there is a negative and 
statistically significant correlation between care hours and work hours. In this case, the 
unobservable factors provide a clear indication of a conflict between two the competing uses of 
time.  
1.5.2 Wage Effects 
Theory predicts that higher wages should lead to an increase in hours of work. In addition, 
as the opportunity cost of time increases, hours of care should decline. The results show that an 
increase in predicted log wage leads to only small decreases in care hours for both men and 
women. Further, the results are statistically insignificant in both cases. Conclusions from recent 
literature can help explain this result. According to Nizalova (2012), wage elasticity estimates of 
informal care are subject to an omitted variable bias and thus biased upward. For example, some 
people may be more productive in everything they do, which is difficult to control for with a 
conventional set of variables available to researchers. Therefore, these people would provide 
more care, but also would be rewarded in the market with higher wages. In addition, the price of 
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formal care is likely to be higher for people living in high-wage areas, and a high price of formal 
care might mean more hours of informal care (if formal and informal care are substitutes for each 
other). Thus, failure to control for price of formal care would further result in an upward biased 
estimate of wage effect on informal caregiver time.  
1.5.3 Other Characteristics 
While some previous research has suggested that African Americans express stronger 
kinship support than whites (Dilworth-Anderson et al., 2005), the overall evidence on racial 
differences in caregiving has been mixed. For instance, Janevic and Connell (2001) conclude that 
minority groups may not have more available support than whites. In addition, prior research has 
also found that Black elders receive more informal help mainly because Blacks are more 
disabled (Li and Fries, 2005). Nevertheless, we find that even after controlling for parental need, 
being black (as opposed to white) increases care hours among both men and women (although 
the result is statistically significant only for men). 
 Among women, being black decreases the frequency of moderate physical activity by 
about 9%. Each additional sister reduces average care hours for both men (by about nine hours) 
and women (by about 24 hours). Similarly, among women, each additional sister-in-law reduces 
women’s average care hours by about 14 hours. These variables are most likely picking up the 
presence of substitute caregivers. 
Interestingly, indicators of health risk factors (smoking history and lagged BMI) do not 
significantly predict care hours for either men or women. However, as expected, each additional 
unit of lagged BMI is associated with decreases in the probability of engaging in both types of 
physical activity multiple times a week for both men and women. BMI is also associated with 
decreased work hours among women.   
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Among women, each additional ADL need of the spouse leads to a 22 hour reduction in 
care hours to parents. This suggests that time allocated to caring for spouse competes with time 
allocated to caring for parents. Another control for intra-household demands on the respondent’s 
time is the number of children in the household. Among women, there is no effect of each 
additional child in the household on time allocation to parents. Interestingly, among men, each 
additional child leads to a small but statistically significant decrease in care hours to parents. 
Previous literature on the phenomenon of “sandwich generation” has found very limited 
evidence of a competition for assistance between children and older parents (Grundy and 
Henretta, 2006). It is possible that men are responding to their spouse’s time allocation to parents 
by taking on more responsibility for child-care. However, this is only a speculation as empirical 
research on this topic has focused almost exclusively on women (DeRigne and Ferrante, 2012).  
1.6 Conclusion 
Caregiving for family members has often been described as a 36-hour day. This notion has 
motivated researchers to ask the following question: If family members are allocating their time 
to provide care, what other productive uses of their time are they giving up? In this paper, we 
examined whether, from a time allocation perspective, a conflict exists between care hours and 
frequency of leisure-time physical activity. If such a tradeoff is present and if it induces a 
decrease in physical activity to levels below minimum guidelines set forth by the CDC, then the 
promotion of physical activity might become a goal of publicly-supported programs such as the 
NFCSP.  
In our joint model of time use, parental factors associated with increased allocation of time 
to parents do not appear to strongly induce corresponding reductions in the frequency of physical 
activity. Further, unobserved factors influencing time transfers to parents and frequency of 
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physical activity—factors collectively represented by the regression error terms—were positively 
correlated across equations, at least among men. This positive correlation indicates that net of 
measured covariates, individuals who are motivated to provide care also have a taste for 
engaging in physical activity. Put another way, these two types of time-allocation decisions 
appear to be complements rather than substitutes. It may be the case that busy, active individuals 
are those most likely to take on caregiver tasks, but that they simply add those tasks to an 
already-busy schedule, contributing to the “36-hour day” image. 
In the previous section, we provided a few examples of unobservable factors that might 
explain this positive correlation. In addition to those factors, it is possible that the variation in the 
time units (within the HRS) for measuring each type of activity—biannually for care hours, 
weekly for exercise and work hours—could have led to this result. Because care hours are 
measured over such a long interval, estimates could potentially be biased downwards. That is, 
over a long time period (such as two years) individuals are likely to make adjustments to 
accommodate potential time-allocation conflicts.  Alternatively, it is probable that if one had 
daily measures on time spent in various activities (such as from time diary data), the results 
would demonstrate large negative tradeoffs. In a very short time interval, using one’s time in any 
given way tends, almost mechanically, to “crowd out” other potential time uses. However, such 
results might overstate the effects if these time conflicts are smoothed over a two-year period. 
Therefore, the time-period over which to examine these conflicts remains on open question, one 
that has key implications for any policy intervention in this area. 
 The empirical results of this paper are suggestive of a tradeoff between caregiving and 
work hours. Even after controlling for parental need, predicted log wage and other variables, the 
error correlations show a statistically significant, negative correlation between care time and paid 
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work for both men and women, indicating that time spent in caring competes with time in the 
labor market. Also, among men, having a mother who cannot be left alone for an hour (one of 
the more severe need categories) reduces weekly work hours by approximately four hours.  
To conclude, we found that increases in caregiving hours primarily appear to be in 
response to the severity of parental health needs. There was limited evidence that parental need 
factors were also associated with a decreasing frequency of physical activity. An extension of 
this work would be to further disaggregate leisure hours (into sleep, recreation, and family time) 
to more comprehensively answer the question: where do care hours come from?  
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 Table 1-1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Females Males 
Sample Size 3,892 4,766 
A. Dependent Variables Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Upper Bound Care Hours, unconditional  683.81 2021.56 365.01 1403.10 
Lower Bound Care Hours, unconditional 197.48 624.56 108.36 387.83 
Upper Bound Care Hours, conditional  1625.78 2861.34 1013.77 2193.57 
Lower Bound Care Hours, conditional 469.52 920.96 300.96 599.93 
Prevalence of caregiving (%) 42% 36% 
Moderate exercise - multiple times a week (%) 56% 60% 
Vigorous exercise - multiple times a week (%) 25% 33% 
Work Hours, unconditional (weekly) 23.07 21.66 31.63 23.81 
Work Hours, conditional (weekly) 37.87 14.47 44.63 14.82 
B. Explanatory Variables Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Mother is alive (%) 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.50 
Mother cannot be left alone for an hour (%) 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 
Mother needs ADL care (%) 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 
Mother died in last two years with an illness (%) 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22 
Mother died in last two years without an illness (%) 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 
Mother is married (%) 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 
Father is alive (%) 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 
Father cannot be left alone for an hour (%) 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
Father needs ADL care (%) 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 
Father died in last two years with an illness (%) 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 
Father died in last two years without an illness (%) 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 
Father is married (%) 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 
Age/100 0.58 0.03 0.59 0.03 
Race: white (%) 0.78 0.41 0.84 0.37 
Race: black (%) 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.33 
Race: other (%) 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 
Married/partnered (%) 0.71 0.46 0.87 0.33 
Predicted Log Wage 2.88 0.31 3.17 0.30 
Not Working (%) 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.45 
Net Financial Wealth (in thousands) 94.14 308.23 117.28 547.91 
Education: HS dropout (%) 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 
Education HS Grad (%) 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45 
Education: Some college (%) 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.44 
Education: College Plus (%) 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.47 
Number of Sisters 1.71 1.58 1.53 1.47 
Ever smoked 100 cigarettes (%) 0.48 0.50 0.64 0.48 
Lagged BMI 28.53 6.48 28.54 4.85 
Spouse's  ADL needs 0.11 0.49 0.12 0.55 
Spouse's age 41.43 27.18 47.91 19.06 
Spouse's  work experience 25.86 18.71 23.14 14.17 
Number of Spouse's sisters 1.08 1.40 1.48 1.59 
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Table 1-2 : Determinants of Time Allocation: Women 
  
Care Care 
(dy/dx) 
Mod. Mod. 
(dy/dx) 
Vig. Vig. 
(dy/dx) 
Work Work 
(dy/dx) 
Constant 627.83  0.48  0.09  -190.00**  
 (461.35)  (0.99)  (1.21)  (23.85)  
Mom not left alone 334.69*** 214.36 0.10 0.03 0.23 0.05 -2.40 -1.59 
 (66.61)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (1.90)  
Mom has ADL needs 405.96*** 264.85 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.02 -1.68 -1.12 
 (90.34)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (1.61)  
Dad not left alone 199.23* 122.85 0.10 0.03 -0.19 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 
 (84.01)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (3.39)  
Dad has ADL needs 257.11** 161.72 0.32 0.09 -0.54** -0.10 0.47 0.32 
 (82.52)  (0.17)  (0.20)  (3.15)  
Mom died with illness 404.19*** 264.96 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.75 0.51 
 (65.84)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (1.78)  
Mom died w/o illness 293.41*** 187.45 0.15 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 4.82 3.39 
 (88.25)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (2.66)  
Dad died with illness 58.56 34.00 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 1.97 1.35 
 (46.03)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (1.78)  
Dad died w/o illness 105.56 62.67 0.03 0.01 0.64* 0.15 -0.26 -0.18 
 (76.94)  (0.27)  (0.29)  (4.33)  
Mom married -70.50 -38.98 0.36** 0.10 0.16 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
 (44.55)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (2.27)  
Dad married -102.34 -55.97 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -2.50 -1.66 
 (62.77)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (2.60)  
Predicted log wage -20.02 -11.34 0.28 0.11 0.37 0.11 154.96*** 104.73 
 (148.68)  (0.33)  (0.41)  (8.93)  
Black 83.52 48.51 -0.30** -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -1.20 -0.81 
 (60.42)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (2.15)  
Other 134.29 80.39 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.03 9.29** 6.74 
 (107.61)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (2.95)  
Lagged BMI -1.78 -1.01 0.05*** -0.02 0.04*** -0.01 -0.34** -0.23 
 (2.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.11)  
No. of sisters -43.17*** -24.45 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.14 
 (9.73)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.42)  
Spouse's ADL needs -39.02* -22.10 0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.03 0.33 0.22 
 (15.29)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (1.30)  
No. coresident children -14.62 -8.27 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
 (17.38)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (1.04)  
No. of Spouse's sisters -25.16** -14.25 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 
 (9.24)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.58)  
Rho: Care   0.03  0.03  -0.15**  
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  
Sigma: Person Effect 497.85***  0.95***  1.14***  24.17***  
 (77.04)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.69)  
Sigma: Pure Noise 537.11***  1.00  1.00  15.82***  
  (60.01)       (0.64)   
Significance: '*' = 5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. Standard errors are Huber-corrected.                                                                                                             
Controls: in-law needs and marital status, age, education, smoking status, number of brothers, marital status, spouse's age, 
spouse's work experience, spouse's brothers, wealth and wave dummies.  
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Table 1-3 : Determinants of Time Allocation: Men 
  Care Care 
(dy/dx) 
Mod. Mod. 
(dy/dx) 
Vig. Vig. 
(dy/dx) 
Work Work 
(dy/dx) 
Constant -116.62  -0.24  -0.29  -30.38  
 (526.77)  (1.63)  (1.88)  (34.49)  
Mom not left alone 120.53* 64.53 0.04 0.01 -0.19 -0.04 -4.98* -3.88 
 (57.62)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (2.06)  
Mom has ADL needs 100.91** 53.06 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.01 1.41 1.14 
 (37.05)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (1.65)  
Dad not left alone 200.25*** 114.29 0.15 0.04 -0.17 -0.04 4.04 3.30 
 (59.55)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (2.73)  
Dad has ADL needs 186.95** 105.34 -0.18 -0.05 -0.33 -0.07 -1.44 -1.14 
 (63.20)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (2.29)  
Mom died with illness 275.31*** 163.18 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 2.04 1.65 
 (52.48)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (1.83)  
Mom died w/o illness 182.60*** 102.91 -0.14 -0.04 0.31 0.07 6.02* 4.97 
 (43.95)  (0.18)  (0.21)  (2.66)  
Dad died with illness 160.37*** 88.70 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.02 -4.23 -3.31 
 (48.06)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (2.39)  
Dad died w/o illness 46.60 23.68 0.49* 0.13 -0.15 -0.03 3.08 2.51 
 (41.64)  (0.21)  (0.25)  (3.04)  
Mom married -49.45 -23.39 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.00 -1.30 -1.03 
 (73.23)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (2.54)  
Dad married 93.18 48.22 -0.23 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -2.16 -1.72 
 (61.83)  (0.17)  (0.20)  (2.68)  
Predicted log wage -141.90 -69.36 0.41 0.16 0.57 0.21 77.53*** 62.12 
 (199.13)  (0.58)  (0.67)  (12.18)  
Black 130.87*** 69.53 -0.15 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -9.59*** -7.34 
 (39.14)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (2.23)  
Other 133.51 72.24 -0.10 -0.03 -0.12 -0.03 5.72 4.71 
 (80.37)  (0.15)  (0.20)  (3.23)  
Lagged BMI 3.42 1.67 0.03*** -0.01 0.04*** -0.02 -0.13 -0.10 
 (1.88)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.13)  
No. of sisters -17.39** -8.50 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.26 -0.21 
 (5.68)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.41)  
Spouse's  ADL needs -21.96 -10.73 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -1.65 -1.32 
 (12.91)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.95)  
No. coresident children -24.07** -11.76 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.52 0.41 
 (9.07)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.71)  
No. of Spouse's sisters -4.71 -2.30 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.30 0.24 
 (5.41)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.38)  
Rho: Care   0.16**  0.08*  -0.08*  
   (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Sigma: Person Effect 294.95***  0.97***  1.28***  25.32***  
 (38.35)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.67)  
Sigma: Pure Noise 358.30***  1.00  1.00  17.11***  
  (32.07)       (0.45)   
Significance: '*' = 5%; '**'=1%; '***'=0.1%. Standard errors are Huber-corrected.                                                                                                             
Controls: in-law needs and marital status, age, education, smoking status, number of brothers, marital status, spouse's age, 
spouse's work experience, spouse's brothers, wealth and wave dummies.  
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Essay 2: How Does Dementia Onset in Parents Influence Adult 
Children’s Wealth? 
2.1 Introduction 
The American population is aging at an accelerated pace. By 2050, the number of 
individuals age 65 and older is projected to more than double and to comprise about 20% of the 
entire population, up from 12% in 2000 and 8% in 1950 (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). 
As a consequence, the prevalence of age-associated chronic diseases is also expected to surge. 
Dementia is a disease of particular concern because it is a debilitating condition that affects 
memory and cognition and eventually leads to a loss in independent functioning, thus 
necessitating the demand for extensive long-term care (LTC).  
Families, especially adult children, are seen as a first line of defense in providing care 
and support to the elderly with a chronic illness or disability (Carmichael et al., 2008; Van 
Houtven and Norton, 2004). There are a variety of channels through which adult children 
respond to parents’ LTC needs. Soldo and Hill (1993) note that upstream intergenerational 
transfers entail three “currencies” or forms: time, money and residential space. With the 
projected doubling of the elderly in the U.S., there are growing concerns relating to the economic 
cost of parents’ LTC needs on their adult children. Citing the wide ranging impact of dementia, 
President Obama signed the National Alzheimer’s Project Act in 2011, an important goal of 
which is to improve the ability of the federal government to track the monetary costs of dementia 
incurred by individuals and their families (National Alzheimer’s Association, 2012).  
In this paper, I use seven waves of longitudinal data (1998-2010) from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) to investigate the impact of reported dementia onset among elderly 
parents on the subsequent change in their adult children’s wealth. The data includes information 
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on children before and during parental illness. In order to increase the relevancy and applicability 
of this research, and to facilitate a clearer interpretation of findings, I focus only on unmarried 
adult children. To check for robustness of results, I examine the effect for unmarried only 
children. Further, I also analyze the possibility of delayed effects and the various mechanisms for 
wealth changes.   
This paper makes three contributions. First, it extends the limited existing literature on 
financial consequences of parents’ LTC needs. Even though family care to older adult has been a 
key topic of research for many years, the emphasis of this work has mainly been on health and 
social consequences of care provision (Keating et. al., 2013).   
Second, by examining a broader financial outcome, household wealth, this paper allows 
for a relatively more comprehensive attribution of parents’ LTC-related monetary costs. 
Currently, the few studies on financial implications of parents’ chronic needs largely examine the 
opportunity costs of informal care in terms of lost wages and reduced hours of work (Keating et 
al., 2013). This literature is yet to reach a consensus. Lilly et al. (2007) and Van Houtven, Coe 
and Skira (2013) provide recent reviews of work in this area. More importantly, as noted above, 
labor market effects only relate to the time tradeoff associated with informal caregiving, thus 
overlooking other transfer “currencies” as well as the potentially simultaneous nature of all three 
forms of transfers. 
 Third, it overcomes the tendency of existing literature to focus only on caregiver-related 
outcomes. To my knowledge, all existing studies that specifically analyze financial impact for 
family members of the elderly (Hurd et. al., 2013; Greenfield, 2013; Wakabayashi and Donato, 
2009) examine these consequences for those who provide informal care to the elderly. However, 
informal caregiving is not a prerequisite for incurring monetary costs on account of parents’ ill 
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health – i.e., adult children who do not provide informal care may still bear a financial burden if 
they provide monetary assistance or incur out-of-pocket expenditures on behalf of parents. This 
paper addresses this limitation by examining the effect of parents’ dementia on the wealth 
accumulation of their adult children in general, irrespective of the adult child’s status as an 
informal caregiver. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides background on various channels 
through which dementia onset among parents may influence an adult child’s wealth. Section 2.3 
lays out the methodology. Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical 
strategy and findings, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Background  
Previous literature generally suggests that the provision and support of LTC to elderly 
parents is likely to lead to negative financial consequences for the adult child. According to Fast 
et al. (1999) and Keating et al. (2013), there are two main channels through which this might 
occur. First, families can incur out-of-pocket expenses in response to health needs of a parent. 
These expenses may include payments for formal care (nursing home stays, assisted living 
facilities, home-based personal care), medical supplies, doctor visits, transportation, household 
items and utilities. Adult children may also incur expenditures for purchasing professional 
services (physical therapists, geriatricians, lawyers) on behalf of the parent. They may also spend 
on home modifications such as ramps and bathroom grab bars. Because dementia undermines 
parents’ ability to function independently, it can also motivate decisions regarding co-residence 
or proximity, which in turn may entail moving or other transaction costs. Adult children may 
also incur personal expenditures such as payments for respite care, housekeeping and child care 
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(for those individuals in the “sandwich generation”), as well as alternative health services (like 
counseling, massage, yoga, and so on). 
Second, adult children may face direct losses in labor income if they take time off from 
work, leave full-time jobs for more flexible part-time jobs, forgo promotions or quit work 
altogether. While working on a part-time or an hourly basis may offer a flexible schedule, it can 
also lead to wage penalties. Wage penalties, temporary time off or early retirement may all lead 
to lower contributions to Social Security, while the take-up of part-time jobs can specifically 
cause a loss of access to employer-sponsored retirement and health insurance plans. Out-of-
pocket expenditures combined with foregone income due to negative employment consequences 
could potentially cause the adult child to dip into savings or to borrow in order to smooth 
consumption over the entire period of the parent’s LTC needs. 
Scholars also note that a dementia diagnosis in particular can exacerbate these negative 
consequences. For instance, formal care for dementia is relatively more expensive than formal 
care in general: while it costs about $3,300 per month for a typical one-bedroom apartment in an 
assisted living facility, the average cost for the same in a “memory care unit” – a special wing in 
an assisted living facility that provides 24 hours supervised care for dementia patients – is about 
$6,000 for a single resident (Adler, 2013). Further, Carpenter and Dave (2004) suggest that 
following a dementia diagnosis, friendship (including neighbors) networks may shift if peers 
distance themselves because they do not understand the disease or attach a stigma to it. The 
authors also note that certain states mandate reporting a dementia diagnosis to the Department of 
Motor Vehicles causing some patients to lose driving privileges due to their newly learnt status. 
Diminishing alternative support networks and parent’s inability to drive may intensify care 
responsibilities on the adult child. 
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From a theoretical standpoint, parental illness need not necessarily lead to a reduction in 
an adult child’s wealth if the elderly transfer assets in order to “spend down” for Medicaid 
eligibility. Medicaid is one of the most important sources of LTC (including institutional care) 
financing in the U.S. but because it is a means-tested program, it covers LTC only for those who 
are poor or have become poor in the process of paying for their long-term or medical care. Thus, 
for many elderly, Medicaid is an insurance program with a deductible equal to one’s non-
housing wealth, creating strong incentives to transfer that wealth to their children. Such a transfer 
basically allows the elderly to protect their bequeathable wealth. Studies have found that there is 
little enforcement of restrictions on the transfer of assets, and that there exists a network of 
professionals to help the elderly successfully shield their assets from Medicaid (Moses, 1990; 
Sloan and Shayne, 1993). Given these various mechanisms, the financial burden of parents’ 
long-term care needs remains an empirical question. 
2.3 Modeling the Effect of Parents’ Health on Adult Child’s Wealth  
In estimating the effect of own-health on own-household wealth, previous literature has 
had to confront the endogenous relationship between health and wealth, due to the likely 
reciprocal causal linkage between health and wealth (i.e., reverse causality) and the possibility 
that unobserved factors make some people both healthier and wealthier (i.e., omitted variable 
bias).  
These issues persist in an intergenerational analysis as well. Previously, I discussed 
different channels through which parents’ health can influence an adult child’s wealth. At the 
same time, it is also possible that an adult child’s wealth influences their parents’ health.7 In 
                                                 
7 For instance, wealthier adult children can facilitate parents’ access to timely and high-quality health care. On the 
other hand, given their high opportunity cost of time, wealthier individuals may be less likely to provide informal 
care to parents , thus potentially influencing the parents’ health in a negative way. 
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addition, due to intergenerational persistence in health (Johnston et al., 2013), there may exist 
unobserved genetic or family background factors that can influence both parents’ health as well 
as the adult child’s wealth.   
To address the endogeneity problems in the own-health and own-wealth case, Smith 
(1999) used panel data to estimate the impact of onset of critical health conditions such as cancer 
or lung disease on changes in wealth, conditioning on initial health status. The key assumption 
here is that a new diagnosis can be treated as plausibly exogenous because it is unlikely to be 
caused by a year-to-year change in wealth. Further, because initial health status is correlated with 
unobserved heterogeneity, controlling for it helps to control for unobservable factors. In other 
words, controlling for baseline health increases one’s confidence that the remaining statistical 
variation in new onsets is “news” (Smith, 1999). 
This method has been widely applied by other scholars as well. Extending the above 
strategy to couples, Wu (2003) demonstrated that new disease onsets among wives have a larger 
impact on household wealth than those among husbands. Lee and Kim (2008) examined the 
effect of health shocks on the wealth of elderly, finding that new health events lowered wealth in 
elders during the period in which they occurred. The authors, however, did not include dementia 
onset as a potential health shock.  
To identify the effect of parents’ LTC needs on adult child’s wealth, I follow a similar 
approach using longitudinal data on adult child’s household savings decisions in combination 
with a plausibly exogenous measure of change in parental health: the onset of dementia. To my 
knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates the effect of new health events on wealth changes 
in an intergenerational framework. The general regression equation for this analysis is specified 
as follows: 
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              (1) 
 Here,  is the coefficient of interest which represents the differential change in wealth 
in the case of parental dementia onset, relative to no parental dementia onset. Baseline health 
represents the health of the parent before any dementia diagnosis was reported.  X represents 
other control variables and  is a vector of coefficients on these controls. 
I focus the analysis only on unmarried adult children for three reasons. First, past 
research has found marital status to be an important determinant of an adult child’s caregiving 
behavior. Unmarried individuals are more likely to provide informal care (Dwyer and Cowrad 
1991; Wolf, 2014) and financial support (Lee and Aytac, 1998) to parents compared to married 
couples.  Having an unmarried child also increases the probability of co-residence (Pezzin and 
Schone, 1999). It is possible that families employ a selection process where the elderly tends to 
rely on the child with fewest competing responsibilities for their care needs (Brody, 2006). 
However, other scholars have demonstrated that these differences between married and 
unmarried in the provision of informal care and financial support to parents persist even when 
structural characteristics like time demands, needs and resources, and demographic and extended 
family characteristics are controlled (Sarkisian and Gerstel, 2008).  This suggests that in 
analyzing the effect of parents’ LTC needs, unmarried individuals form a more relevant study 
population. 
Second, marriage inevitably adds complexity to family structure leading to difficult 
specification issues. Married couples may share the burden of informal care among each other. 
They can also self-insure, i.e., if increasing care responsibilities lead to reduced earnings or early 
exit from the labor force for an adult child, then the spouse may compensate by increasing work 
effort (either in hours or years of work) (Coe, Skira and Van Houtven, 2011).  Additionally, 
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married couples likely have two sets of parents. On the one hand, this may represent competing 
claims on a households’ time and resources. On the other, they may receive an inheritance from 
one set of parents (due to death of a parent or in-law) and dissave (due to health needs of a 
parent/in-law) on account of the other set. Further, a couples’ wealth response is also conditioned 
by the presence of two sets of sibling networks that can provide alternative sources of time and 
resources. Thus, controlling for all possible patterns of response would require the inclusion of 
several variables and their interactions. However, given the modest incidence of dementia, 
modeling these complexities is expected to use up too many degrees of freedom.  
Third, if couples make decisions about “big-ticket” items like parents’ nursing home or 
assisted living expenses as a collective, they may face intra-household bargaining pressures. In 
this case, the allocation of resources in response to a parental dementia diagnosis may depend of 
which spouse has more bargaining power (Lundberg and Pollack, 1996). Using household level 
data from Indonesia, Khemani (1999) does find evidence of bargaining between husbands and 
wives over transfers to their respective parents. Therefore, depending upon the division of labor 
in a given household, there may be differences in the strength of household response on the basis 
of whether dementia occurs for the husbands’ parents or the wife’s parents. In contrast, 
unmarried individuals are likely to enjoy substantial control over decisions relating to supporting 
parent’s LTC needs.  
2.4 Data  
The data for this analysis come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
nationally representative, longitudinal survey of individuals age 51 and older.  The HRS began in 
1992 and individuals are interviewed every even numbered year.  The age profile of the 
respondents makes their parents prime candidates for needing LTC. The HRS provides in-depth 
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information about the economic status of households (including wealth and income) and parents’ 
LTC needs.  
2.4.1 Sample and Measures 
The sample I create from the HRS spans 1998-2010 (questions on parent’s memory 
disease were asked for the first time in 1998). It includes unmarried adult children (separated, 
divorced, widowed, or never married) observed over three consecutive waves: “baseline” wave 
(w-2), “lagged” wave (w-1) and “current” wave (w). Because the HRS is a biennial survey, the 
time period from baseline wave (w-2) to current wave (w-1) is a four-year window. An 
individual can have a maximum of five person-wave observations: the earliest can occur when 
“current” wave equals 3 (2002) and the latest can occur when “current” wave equals 7 (2010).  
With regard to parents’ health, the HRS asks the respondent whether a “doctor ever said 
that your parent has a memory-related disease?” As illustrated in Figure 2-1, the sample is 
restricted to those who report at least one living parent in the baseline wave (w-2) and lagged 
wave (w-1), and that none of the living parents ever received a dementia diagnosis in the 
baseline wave (w-2). The main independent variable – dementia onset in parents – is a dummy 
that equals 1 if at least one parent received a dementia diagnosis in the lagged wave (w-1).  I call 
this the “treatment group.” Dementia onset in parents equals 0 if none of the parents received a 
dementia diagnosis in the lagged wave (w-1). This is the “control group.”  
The dependent variable is the difference in total household wealth between the current 
wave (w) and the lagged wave (w-1). Household wealth equals the total value of all assets, minus 
total debts. Household assets consist of financial and nonfinancial assets, including housing 
equity, other real estate, vehicles, business equity, IRA or Keogh or retirement accounts, stocks 
or mutual funds, checking, savings or money-market funds, CDs, government bonds or treasury 
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bills, other bonds, and other assets. Total debts are the sum of all reported debts. All dollar 
figures are expressed in 2010 dollars.  
While change in wealth is measured between current wave (w) and lagged wave (w-1), 
change in parental health is measured between lagged wave (w-1) and baseline wave (w-2). This 
is because I assume that any change in wealth as a result of parent receiving a memory disease 
diagnosis is unlikely to be contemporaneous. The adult child may adjust out-of-pocket 
expenditures to assist the parent in the short-term.  
In order to avoid issues relating to receipt of inheritance, I exclude those adult children 
who report that the diagnosed parent died by current wave (w). Analogously, in the control 
group, I restrict the analysis to those who continue to have at least one living parent in current 
wave (w). This results in the loss of 389 cases. After deleting cases with incomplete information, 
there 1,540 person-wave observations (699 unique observations) for unmarried individuals. 
As described in the previous section, it is important to control for baseline health 
conditions of the parent that make some parents more susceptible to memory disease than others. 
Unfortunately, the HRS does not include information on the parent’s own or family medical 
history. I attempt to overcome this by controlling for whether the adult child provided substantial 
support to parents in completing Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) in the baseline 
year. IADLs are essential for an individual to live independently in the community and include 
activities such as household chores, managing finances and medication, transportation, and so 
on. Previous research has indicated that IADL disability is a useful predictor for diagnosing 
dementia at 1- and 2-year follow-up (Sikkes, 2011).  
For IADL help, the HRS asks respondents: “Did you spend a total of 100 or more hours 
[since last interview] helping your (deceased) [parents/in-laws] with things such as household 
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chores, errands, transportation, etc.?” If the answer to this question is “yes” then the respondent is 
asked: “Roughly how many hours did you spend [since last interview, in the last two years] giving 
such assistance to your parents/in-laws?”  
A sizeable proportion of individuals who responded affirmatively to providing more than 
100 hours of IADL help answered “don’t know” to the subsequent question on the actual number 
of help hours. These respondents were then asked a follow-up question asking them to choose 
from among three possible ranges of help hours: 0-199 hours; 200-499 hours; and 500-5000 
hours. Responses in the middle or the top category are assumed to represent the provision of 
“substantial” IADL help to parents. In addition to IADL help, I also control for parents’ age. 
Parent’s age is measured as the maximum age across living parents in the baseline wave (w-2). 
Other correlates include wave dummies, respondent’s age, race and education, as well as, 
parent’s education measured as the maximum education among parents in the baseline wave (w-2).   
2.4.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2-1 presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample, and for the treatment and 
control groups separately. The average age of the sample is 63. A large majority of the sample -
over 70% - is women. This is because women are less like to remarry after a divorce (Livingston, 
2014) and also tend to outlive men, and are therefore more likely to be un-partnered.  
The percentage of treated cases in the sample is about 7%. This is lower than population 
estimates - according to Plassman et al. (2007), the prevalence of dementia among individuals 
age 71 and older is about 14%. One reason for this is because I restrict the analysis to only those 
cases where the parent receiving dementia diagnosis survives until current wave (w). Without 
conditioning on the ill parent being alive in the current wave (w), the percent of treated cases is 
about 11%, which is in the range of population estimates. It is also important to keep in mind that 
Memory disease is also a commonly late- and under-diagnosed condition. While family members 
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may notice changes in daily functioning of the elderly, it often does not directly lead to a 
consultation with a healthcare professional. This is because family members misattribute these 
symptoms to those of normal aging or stress (van Vliet et al., 2011). Evidence of untimely 
dementia diagnosis suggests that the treatment variable in the regressions may be measured with 
error. Controlling for initial health status of the parent, it is unlikely that the timing and accuracy 
of dementia diagnosis differs systematically among adult children. Thus, the measurement error 
in dementia diagnosis is likely to bias the coefficients towards zero and provide a conservative 
estimate of the true result.    
The provision of substantial IADL support in the baseline wave is higher in the treatment 
group than in the control group. The difference is statistically significant at 1%. This is expected 
and appears to support the findings from previous literature. In addition, parents in the treated 
group are slightly older than parents in the control group. This is also expected as the prevalence 
of dementia increases with age. There are no statistically significant differences in respondent’s 
race and education between the treatment and control groups.  
The mean change in wealth between current wave (w) and lagged wave (w-1) for the 
entire sample is about -$23,000. However, the standard deviation for the measure is quite large, 
suggesting that the mean may not represent an adequate summary of the variable. Therefore, I 
also provide values for the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles of the wealth change distribution. For the 
full sample, here is no change in wealth at the median. Values at quantiles above the median 
reflect wealth accumulation while those below the median reflect wealth de-accumulation. 
A simple estimation (with no other covariates and bootstrapped standard errors) shows 
that there is no statistically significant difference in wealth accumulation for those in the 
treatment group relative to those in the control group at the 25th quantile and at the median. 
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However, at the 75th quantile, being in the treatment group is associated with a reduced level of 
wealth accumulation and this difference between the two groups is statistically significant. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Main Results 
To identify the effect of parental dementia onset, I regress the change in unmarried adult 
child’s wealth between current wave (w) and lagged wave (w-1) on the treatment variable for 
lagged dementia onset in parents (see equation 1). I control for the unmarried adult child’s age, 
race, and education, parent’s age, parent’s education and a dichotomous variable for whether the 
child provided any parent with substantial amount of IADL support in the baseline wave (w-2). 
The empirical model also controls for wave dummies.   
Although the asset data from the HRS is of very high quality, scholars have noted the 
presence of noise in wave-to-wave change in wealth (Hill, 2006). In addition, because wealth 
data contains many outliers, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is expected to yield imprecise 
estimates (Wu, 2003). Researchers often apply natural log transformations to adjust for skewness 
in wealth. However, natural log may not be the most appropriate transformation for measures of 
net wealth and change in wealth as both include zero and negative values.  
Further, an OLS regression estimates the average effect, but it possible that parental 
dementia onset influences points other than the mean of the response distribution. For instance, 
individuals who incur large amount of debt between waves may be less able to deplete wealth on 
account of parents’ illness. Correspondingly, those who are able to save between waves – in 
other words, those who have wealth to deplete – may be more able to spend on parents’ LTC 
needs. 
42 
 
 
To address the issue of skewness and to investigate the effect of dementia onset in 
parents along different locations of the wealth change distribution (called the savings distribution 
from hereon), I estimate the model using the unconditional quantile regressions (UQR) estimator 
proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). In contrast to the conventional quantile 
regression framework, the unconditional quantile regression method provides more interpretable 
results as it marginalizes the effect over the distributions of other covariates in the model.  
Table 2-2 presents estimates of 𝛽1 from the specification described in equation 1 in which 
parameters are estimates of various quantiles of the savings distribution. A limitation of UQR is, 
at the time of writing, that there is no statistically valid method to cluster standard errors. I rely 
on bootstrapped standard errors using 500 repetitions in my UQR regressions.    
There is little effect of dementia onset on the unmarried adult child’s savings at all lower 
quantiles of the distribution. That is, among those who dissave or do not add to their wealth 
between-waves, there is no statistically significant effect of receiving a parental dementia 
diagnosis on wealth. However, above the median, the differential effect of being in the treatment 
group relative to the control group is negative and statistically significant. Specifically, as 
indicated in Table 2-2, a parental dementia diagnosis decreases an unmarried adult child’s 
household wealth accumulation by about $7,300 at the 55th percentile. When compared to the 
unconditional 55th percentile of wealth change for the entire sample - $1,266- this represents a 
very large decrease. In fact, at the 55th, 60th, 65th, and 75th quantiles, belonging to the treatment 
group potentially wipes out any savings whatsoever.  
At the 90th quantile, as a result of parents’ dementia diagnosis, the treatment group is 
saving about $57,000 less than the control group. As compared to the 55th quantile, this reduction 
is relatively smaller (~41%) given that the 90th quantile of the response variable is $137,411. 
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Thus, towards the very top of the savings distribution, the effective magnitude of the treatment 
effect (or the relative “pinch” due to parents’ dementia diagnosis) becomes a little smaller.  
2.5.2 Robustness Check 
The main empirical result of this paper indicates that a parental dementia diagnosis leads 
to reductions in wealth for unmarried individuals in the upper quantiles of the savings 
distribution. Intuitively, this reduction in wealth accumulation should be steeper for those 
unmarried children who are also only children, i.e., those without siblings because they have to 
potentially bear the entire parent care burden independently.  
To account for siblings, I create a dichotomous variable, presence of siblings, which 
equals 1 if the adult child has one or more siblings and 0 otherwise. 8.4% of the sample has no 
siblings. To examine how parent’s dementia diagnosis influences the wealth of unmarried only 
children, I interact the variable, presence of siblings, with the treatment variable.  With the 
inclusion of the main effect and the interaction, the coefficient on the treatment variable 
estimates the effect for an unmarried adult child with no siblings. 
As hypothesized, coefficient estimates illustrated in Figure 2-2 demonstrate that the 
negative effect of parents’ dementia diagnosis are larger for unmarried only children. For 
instance, among unmarried only children, at the 55th and 75th percentiles, a dementia diagnosis in 
parents leads to a reduction in wealth of about $29,000 and $68,000 respectively. In the case of 
unmarried only children, the treatment effect is also statistically significant for a larger part of 
the distribution. In addition to most upper quantiles of the savings distribution, the parents’ 
dementia diagnosis also leads to a statistically significant negative effects at the 45th and 50th 
quantiles. The coefficients for quantiles lower than the 45th quantile remain insignificant. 
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2.5.3 Delayed Effects 
To examine if negative effects of parental dementia diagnosis persist over time, I extend 
the analysis over four waves instead of three. In addition to the baseline wave (w-2), lagged 
wave (w-1) and current wave (w), I also include a “next wave (w+1).” I condition this analysis 
on the dementia diagnosed parent remaining alive until next wave (w+1) in the treatment group, 
and at least one parent remaining alive in the next wave (w+1) for the control group. This 
reduces the sample size to 887 cases.  
Change in wealth is analyzed over next wave (w+1) and current wave (w), while 
dementia onset in parent is still measured over lagged wave (w-1) and baseline wave (w-2). To 
illustrate, for an unmarried adult child who entered the sample for the first time in 1998, 
dementia onset is captured between 2000 and 1998, while change in wealth is now measured 
between 2004 and 2002. This represents a six-year window. 
  Table 2-3 shows the quantile regression coefficients for this analysis. The pattern of 
findings is similar to the main results, i.e., a parental dementia onset influences household 
savings at upper quantiles of the savings distribution. These findings indicate that in the upper 
quantiles of the savings distribution, unmarried individuals who received a parental dementia 
diagnosis as far back as five years ago are still saving less or dissaving as compared to those 
whose parents did not receive a dementia diagnosis.   
2.5.4 Mechanisms 
As discussed in Section 2, parents’ LTC needs can negatively influence an adult child’s 
wealth through two channels: out-of-pocket expenses, providing monetary assistance, and losses 
in labor income. In this section, I will attempt to examine the potential roles of both mechanisms 
in leading to a reduction in an unmarried adult children’s wealth. 
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Previous research has indicated that formal care expenses (particularly for nursing 
homes) comprise a substantial part of the overall out-of-pocket expenditures borne by caregivers 
(Evercare and NAC, 2007).  In order for this to occur, a dementia diagnosis should increase the 
likelihood of parent residing in a nursing home. To provide empirical evidence on this, I estimate 
a probit regression where the dependent variable is 1 if an unmarried adult child’s parent resides 
in a nursing home at current wave (w) and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable of interest 
is dementia onset between waves (w-1) and wave (w-2). In addition to the controls used 
previously, I also control for whether parent was in a nursing home in wave (w-1). Robust 
standard errors are clustered by household ID.  
Marginal effects reported in Table 2-4 indicate that net of covariates, a dementia diagnosis 
does indeed lead to a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of a parent residing in a 
nursing home at current wave (w). This provides suggestive evidence that expenditure on nursing 
homes may be a likely mechanism through which the depletion in adult child’s wealth occurs. 
Next, I examine whether parents’ dementia diagnosis leads to changes in an unmarried 
adult child’s household income. The setup is similar to the wealth case described in the main 
section, except here, the key dependent variable is change in adult child’s household income 
(between current wave (w) and lagged wave (w-1)). All dollar figures are expressed in 2010 
dollars. To make the analysis relevant to those in the labor force, I restrict it to individuals below 
age 65. This reduces the sample size to 991 cases. I estimate the model using unconditional 
quantile regressions.  
Similar to the pattern in the wealth regressions, I find (Figure 2-3) that for a large section 
of the upper income change distribution (60th, 65th, 75th, 80th, and 85th quantiles), having a parent 
with dementia onset leads to a reduction in household income. There are no statistically 
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significant effects at lower quantiles of the income change distribution. In other words, for those 
unmarried children who add to their household income between-waves, being in the treatment 
group, relative to the control group, leads to reductions in household income. Further, these 
effects only show up when I restrict the sample to those below age 65 – when the entire sample 
is considered, being in the treatment group leads to small and statistically insignificant effects for 
almost the entire distribution of the dependent variable (results available on request). This 
finding lends support to the idea that reductions in wealth may also come from reductions in 
household income following a parents’ dementia diagnosis. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Americans are living longer, but with increased longevity comes a growing need for 
long-term care services and supports. Unmarried adult children shoulder a disproportionate 
amount of responsibility in ensuring that the elderly parent receives such care. Because adult 
children at this stage are also likely to be planning and saving for their own retirement, 
understanding the financial implications of parents’ LTC becomes important.  
Scholars have previously examined the economic costs borne by family members mainly 
by studying the employment consequences of providing informal care. I contribute a new strand 
to this literature by emphasizing broader dimensions of financial outcomes and by also including 
non-caregiving adult children in the analysis. Specifically, I analyze the effect of dementia onset 
in parents on the change in wealth of their unmarried adult children.  
The findings indicate that parental dementia substantially reduces household wealth of an 
unmarried adult child in the upper quantiles of the wealth-change distribution in the first two 
years after a diagnosis is reported. These effects are large and statistically significant - for several 
upper quantiles, the treatment effect is large enough to wipe out any between-wave savings 
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observed at that quantile. These effects are more pronounced for unmarried adult children 
without siblings. Further, this response is observed to persist in the subsequent time period as 
well. An examination of mechanisms suggests that both, losses in labor income and nursing 
home expenditures, may play a role in leading to wealth declines for those in the treatment 
group.  
It is important to acknowledge that the policy implications of these findings may not be 
straightforward. Wealth declines as a result of parental dementia diagnosis are uneven – they 
appear to be concentrated only among those unmarried adult children who augment their wealth 
between-waves. In order to better understand the characteristics of these unmarried adult 
children, using a probit model, I regress an indicator for belonging to the upper quantiles of the 
savings distribution (above the median) on basic demographic characteristics (age, race and 
education). For brevity, these results are not included, but available on request. I find that 
unmarried adult children in the upper quantiles are likely to have higher levels of education, 
suggesting that those facing wealth depletion consequences as a result of parent’s dementia 
diagnosis may also be more economically advantaged. Thus, even with a potentially targeted 
policy design, ideals of vertical equity may still be compromised.  
More importantly, the nature of public policy intervention depends upon whether this 
wealth depletion is anticipated or unanticipated in nature. There is evidence that a dementia 
diagnosis may constitute “new information” to family members: Pratt & Wilkinson (2003) and 
Aminzadeh et al. (2007) find that patients and their caregivers reported feelings of “shock, fear 
and depression” upon receiving the diagnosis. Others have described the period immediately 
following a parents’ dementia diagnosis as “distinctive” and “transitional” (Keady and Nolan, 
2003; Quinn et al. 2008) because it confirmed the irreversibility of the condition. In fact, before a 
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diagnosis, many care partners did not consider themselves as “caregivers” (de Vugt and Verhey, 
2013). However, it is possible that adult children transfer time and/or money to elderly parents in 
response to prior parent-to-child transfers (Henretta et al., 1997) or in expectation of receiving an 
inheritance later (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985). If by depleting wealth on account of 
parents’ LTC needs, individuals are basically carrying out a previously planned wealth path, then 
a policy that provides financial support to these individuals may not be justified. Future research 
should consider these questions in greater detail.  
That said, even if individuals are able to anticipate some wealth depletion in the future, 
they may still lack information about the actual costs and duration of parents’ LTC needs. In 
addition, if individuals discount the future in somewhat inconsistent and inefficient ways, they 
may underestimate levels of future parental need. Uncertainties relating to the role of other 
family members in the provision of care and support may also exist. According to Folbre and 
Wolf (2012), even raising this subject for discussion can be stressful, contributing to tendencies 
to avoid and procrastinate. Other scholars find that for a large majority of caregivers, the level of 
planning for the relative’s future care needs and knowledge of formal care services was low 
(Ducharme et al., 2011). Because this paper finds substantial wealth depletion following a 
parents’ dementia diagnosis, a case can be made for initiating programs that enhance awareness 
and financial preparedness for LTC needs among families.  
An understanding of the economic impact of LTC on individuals and their families is a 
prerequisite for an informed policy debate. The findings presented in this paper have important 
implications for the measurement of “cost” of parents’ LTC needs. They also highlight the 
importance of considering the distribution of these costs across different individuals. 
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Figure 2-1 : Sample Selection 
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Table 2-1 : Descriptive Statistics 
 All Treatment Control 
 T&C 
Diff. 
Treated (%) 7.30    
IADL help - baseline (%) 22 38 21  *** 
Race: White (%) 69 70.00 69 n.s 
Race: Black (%) 26 26 25 n.s 
Race: Other race (%) 6 4 6 n.s 
High School dropout (%) 18 14 18 n.s 
High School graduate (%) 33 37 33 n.s 
Some College (%) 23 28 25 n.s 
College Plus (%) 23 20 24 n.s 
Age  63 64 63 ** 
 (5.72) (6.06) (5.67)  
Female (%) 72 73 72 n.s 
Mean Change in Wealth [(w)-(w-1)] ($) -23,019 -7,494 -24,248 n.s 
 (1,312,029) (156,244) (1,362,311)  
25thQ. Change in Wealth  [(w)-(w-1)] 
($) -28,460 -35,025 -28,277 n.s 
50thQ. Change in Wealth  [(w)-(w-1)] 
($) 0  -2,383 0  n.s 
75thQ. Change in Wealth  [(w)-(w-1)] 
($) 34,519  13,258 37,354  ** 
     
Parent Variables     
Age of oldest living parent 82 85 82 *** 
 (6.43) (6.00) (6.41)  
Max. parent education (years) 10.18 10.16 10.19 n.s 
 (3.73) (3.84) (3.72)   
Sample Size 1,540 113 1,427 
  
Notes: *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%. Standard Deviation in parenthesis  
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Table 2-2 : Quantile Regressions of Parent's Dementia Onset and change in Unmarried Adult Child's 
Wealth 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  Wealth (w) -  Wealth (w-1)  
 Quantile  
 25th 35th 45th 50th 55th 65th 75th 80th 90th 
Sample quantile -28,460 -8,692 -954 0 1,266 10,350 34,519 55,396 137,411 
 Dementia onset 
in parent  
-4,867 -5,874 -5,922 -5,082 -7,296 -11,425 -36,693 -34,341 -57,105 
t -0.44 -1.32 -1.59 -1.37 -2.02 -2.62 -3.03 -2.12 -1.91 
          
N 1,540 
 All regressions include controls for respondent's age, education, race, parent's education, parent's age at baseline,  
whether respondent provided care to parent at baseline and wave dummies   
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Figure 2-2 : Effect of Dementia Onset on Wealth for Unmarried Only Children 
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Table 2-3 : Delayed Effect Quantile Regressions of Parent's Dementia Onset and change in Unmarried 
Adult Child's Wealth 
Dependent Variable:  Wealth (w+1) -  Wealth (w)  
 Quantile  
 25th 35th 45th 50th 55th 65th 75th 80th 90th 
 Dementia 
onset in parent  
7,138 -3,199 -4,351 -5,552 -11,063 -20,521 -33,690 -54,497 -91,042 
t 0.55 -0.48 -0.73 -0.92 -2.02 -3.56 -1.79 -2.52 -2.87 
          
N 887 
 All regressions include controls for respondent's age, education, race, parent's education, parent's age at baseline,  
whether respondent provided care to parent at baseline and wave dummies   
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  Table 2-4: Probit Regressions of Parent's Dementia Onset and Subsequent NH admission 
Dependent Variable: Parent in a Nursing Home in Current Wave (w) 
     
 Average Marginal Effect  
Between-wave dementia onset in parent 0.06 *** 
 (0.02)  
Parent in NH in Wave (w-1) 0.25  *** 
 (0.02)  
Control for Baseline health of Parent? Yes 
     
N 1,540 
Significance: '*'=10% '**' = 5%; '***'=1%;  Standard errors are clustered by household ID. 
All regressions include controls for respondent's age, education, race, parent's education, 
parent's age at baseline, whether respondent provided care to parent at baseline and wave 
dummies.  
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Figure 2-3 : Effect of Dementia Onset on Income for Unmarried Children 
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Essay 3: Effect of the Personal Care Services State Plan Option 
on Medicaid Expenditures  
3.1 Introduction 
The health care of elderly Americans is universally insured as an entitlement under 
Medicare. However, when it comes to helping the very same people with long-term care (LTC), 
Medicare lends very little protection. A majority of LTC is provided informally by family 
members and friends. In the public sphere, Medicaid – the joint federal/state health program for 
low-income Americans – is the nation’s primary safety net for financing LTC. In 2011, a total of 
$357 billion was spent on long-term services and supports (LTSS), of which 40%8 was 
accounted for by Medicaid (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013).   
When Medicaid was enacted in 1965, coverage for LTC was available almost exclusively 
for services in skilled nursing facilities, leading to a heavy use of nursing homes (or “institutional 
bias”). However, this has changed considerably over time due to high costs of facility care, 
declining quality and consumer preferences to receive LTC in less restrictive settings. In recent 
decades, developing and expanding home and community-based alternatives has become a 
priority for most states. This commitment to “rebalance” publically funded LTC away from 
nursing homes has also been heavily motivated by the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court’s Olmstead 
decision. In its decision, the Court ruled that states must provide services in the most integrated 
settings appropriate to the needs and wishes of people with disabilities. Further, it also stated that 
a failure to do could constitute discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Smith 
et al., 2000).  
                                                 
8 Medicare (which provides limited post-acute care) accounted for 21% of the spending. Direct out-of-pocket 
expenses accounted for 15% of total LTSS spending, with private insurance and other public and private funding 
sources covering 7% and 18%, respectively. 
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In 2009, home and community-based services (HCBS) accounted for 45% of total 
Medicaid LTC spending (Eiken et al., 2010). While states have considerable flexibility in 
designing their LTC benefit package under Medicaid, three program features account for the 
majority of Medicaid HCBS spending: a mandatory home health benefit; a personal care service 
(PCS) State Plan option and section 1915(c) waivers. While all states are required to provide 
home health to those who qualify for institutional care, the other two program features are 
utilized at states’ option. A home health benefit provides a nurse or a specialized aide who can 
assist with tasks such as those that involved in post-surgery rehabilitation at home, including 
simple dressing changes, monitoring complex diet regimens, taking basic vital signs, 
patient/caregiver education etc. It may also include medical supplies and equipment suitable for 
home. A personal care benefit, on the other hand, provides help with daily life tasks such as 
bathing, grooming, light house-work, and so on. 1915(c) waivers can include a wide range of 
HCBS services such as case management, home maker services, adult day health, respite, 
personal care, transportation. 
If a state elects to adopt a PCS State Plan option, then similar to the home health benefit, 
it has to adhere to Federal requirements of “statewideness” and “comparability.” That is, 
personal care services must be available on a comparable basis to all Medicaid eligible 
beneficiaries who meet a pre-established need criteria. In addition, states cannot restrict the 
availability of these services to particular geographic regions.  
In conjunction with, or in the absence of, the PCS benefit, states may also apply for one 
or more 1915(c) waivers that allow them to circumvent the “comparability” and “statewideness” 
requirements of the Medicaid law. With Federal approval, states can use 1915(c) waivers to 
precisely target a wide range of HCBS services to particular categories of beneficiaries (e.g., the 
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elderly or the developmentally disabled), as well as limit these initiatives to particular geographic 
areas. The waivers also permit states to cap the number of participants and establish waiting lists.  
The motivation for the development of instruments like 1915(c) waivers stems from the 
constant dilemma state officials face in promoting access to services on the one hand, and 
controlling costs on the other. Since 1975, all states have had the option of offering PCS as a 
Medicaid State Plan benefit (Le Blanc, Tonner, and Harrington, 2001). However, unlike the 
tremendous growth experienced by 1915(c) waivers9, the PCS benefit is yet to be adopted by all 
states. By 1979, 10 states had adopted the program and this number grew to 25 by the end of 
1990 (Litval and Kennedy, 1991). Currently, 32 states (including DC) have adopted the PCS 
State Plan option. Scholars have argued that the entitlement nature of the program has led to 
concerns over runaway expenditures, which has hindered nation-wide adoption of the PCS State 
Plan option (Ruttner and Irvin, 2013; O’Keeffe et al., 2010; American Public Human Services 
Association/Center for Workers with Disabilities, 2006; Doty, 2000; Weiner and Stevenson, 
1998). Surprisingly, despite these concerns, there has been little empirical work that examines 
whether the PCS State Plan option does in fact lead to an increase in Medicaid expenditures.  
This paper fills the void by examining the effect of adopting the PCS State Plan option on 
Medicaid expenditures over the 1975-2009 period. Because the Medicaid program has evolved 
substantially over the four decades since the PCS State Plan option was made available to states, 
I also investigate whether the effect of PCS on aggregate expenditures varies over time. Finally, I 
provide suggestive evidence on whether states take predicted spending changes into 
consideration when deciding to adopt the PCS State Plan option.  
                                                 
9 Nearly all states and DC offer services through HCBS waivers – currently more than 300 HCBS waiver programs 
are active nationwide (Medicaid.gov, 2015) 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a background on the Medicaid 
PCS State Plan option. Section 3.3 reviews literature on the adoption of PCS benefit across states 
and its relationship to Medicaid expenditures. Section 3.4 lays out the methodology. Section 3.5 
describes the data. Section 3.6 discusses the findings, and Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Background  
Within the range of LTC services is a set of services, generically called “personal care,” 
that refers to “hands-on” or individualized assistance with activities of daily living (ADLs) such 
as eating, bathing, dressing, toileting, and may also include instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADLs) such as grocery shopping, meal preparation, money management, laundry and light 
housework.  
The PCS option was first established administratively in 1975 under the authority of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Smith, 2000). At that time, it had a medical orientation 
where services had to be prescribed by a physician, supervised by a registered nurse, and could 
be delivered only at a person’s residence in accordance with a service plan. Generally, the 
services included assistance with ADL activities. Personal care workers could help with IADL 
activities on a limited basis and only if they were incidental to the delivery of ADL assistance 
(O’Keeffe et al., 2010). 
In 1993, Congress formally added “personal care” as an optional category in the 
Medicaid statute. In doing so, it also broadened the coverage of the PCS benefit. Specifically, it 
made explicit the non-medical nature of personal care by providing that the PCS benefit did not 
need to be physician prescribed or nurse supervised. The new regulations also gave states the 
authorization to provide personal care outside an individual’s home. In subsequent years, 
Medicaid guidelines allowed payment to relatives, except “legally responsible relatives” (i.e., 
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spouses and parents of minor children) for the provision personal care. In addition, they also 
made supervision or cuing an allowable service (Health Care Financing Administration, 1999). 
While states were not required to change the scope of their pre-1993 coverage, they could take 
advantage of the new regulations by amending their existing Medicaid State Plan (O’Keeffe, 
2010).  
The financial eligibility for the PCS optional benefit is determined using each state’s 
standard Medicaid eligibility criteria for the categorically needy. These criteria are usually more 
restrictive than those used to qualify persons for institutional placement or for a 1915 (c) waiver. 
The PCS option can be used to provide services to individuals who have functional limitations 
but do not necessarily meet the institutional level of care criteria. Thus, unlike income eligibility, 
the PCS is less restrictive on need criteria as compared to 1915(c) waivers which require 
individuals to have needs that qualify them for institutional level of care. That said, according to 
Le Blanc, Toner and Harrington (2001), states vary quite a bit in terms of the functional need 
criteria they set for PCS eligibility. Additionally, the authors also note that most states with PCS 
program impose formal limits on service use (hourly limits and/or cost caps) and engage in low 
provider reimbursement to restrict the growth of these programs.  
3.3 Literature Review  
The earliest studies on the PCS State Plan option were done by Litval and Kennedy 
(1991). These studies were based on two national surveys of PCS programs conducted in 1985 
and 1990, as well as site visits to six states which utilized the PCS option. According to the 
authors, initial adopters of the program saw the PCS benefit as one of the few vehicles for 
leveraging federal dollars to expand personal assistance services in an era of shrinking state 
revenues. Prior to that, many states had been using the limited Title XX Social Service Block 
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Grants and other state funds to cover personal care. However, due to new fiscal constraints and 
budget deficits (for instance, in Michigan in 1978), states began to examine the possibility of 
accessing uncapped matching federal funds through Medicaid for this purpose.  
Because PCS State Plan is an optional program, scholars have attempted to examine 
which factors are associated with a state’s decision to adopt the benefit. Using state-level data 
spanning 1992-2002, Kitchener et al. (2007) found four factors to be positively associated with 
the adoption decision: population age 85 and over, percentage nonwhite population, liberal state 
politics and Medicaid nursing home reimbursement rates. The two factors negatively associated 
with this decision were personal income per capita and hospital beds per 1,000 population.  
The growth in the PCS program appears to be uneven over time. According to Litval and 
Kennedy (1991), the PCS option experienced a high rate of growth between 1984 and 1988 when 
the number of recipients rose by 65% and expenditures by 144%. In contrast, Kitchener, Ng and 
Harrington (2007) found that between 1999 and 2002, program participants adjusted for 
population increased by 27%. However, inflation adjusted program expenditures per participant 
did not keep pace and, in fact, declined by 3%. According to the authors, one explanation for a 
decline in expenditure relates to a marked decline in the range of services provided under the 
State Plan benefit, especially transportation.   
In 1981, the introduction of 1915(c) waivers also led to changes in mechanisms for 
providing personal care services: personal care could now be offered through the PCS State Plan 
benefit and/or the HCBS 1915(c) waivers. In 1998-1999, 45 states offered at least some personal 
care in at least one HCBS waiver. The five states that did not offer personal care in their HCBS 
waiver maintained an optional PCS State Plan benefit. 25 states used only the HCBS waiver 
mechanism and 20 states used both programs (Le Blanc, Toner and Harrington, 2001).  
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Ruttner and Irvin (2013) compared service utilization and expenditures for personal 
assistance services in states that offer these services through a PCS State Plan (alternatively 
referred to as “State Plan” from here on) versus through 1915 (c) waivers alone. In order to 
ensure comparability and accuracy, the dataset only included 25 states. They found that when 
compared with states that offer PCS through waivers alone, State Plan states provide more access 
to personal assistance services as measured by the median proportions of Medicaid enrollees and 
HCBS users who use them. State Plan states also tend to spend less per-person, per-month on 
these services when compared with states that offer personal assistance through waivers alone. 
Finally, states that offer these services through their State Plans spend a higher median share of 
their LTC expenditures on HCBS than states that offer these services through waivers alone.  
In practice, the two program features are often used as complements. Some states use the 
State Plan option to provide greater access to basic personal care services and then provide 
additional coverage through waiver programs to specific target populations. Alternatively, some 
states use the PCS benefit to provide services to those who do not have extensive functional 
impairments and therefore do not qualify for HCBS waiver programs. In addition, states use the 
PCS benefit to help individuals who are eligible for HCBS waiver programs but are waiting for 
an available slot in the program (Summer and Ihara, 2005; Weiner, Tilly, Alecxih, 2002).   
Despite the prevailing claim that offering personal assistance services through the State 
Plan option leads to large increases in costs, recent studies on the “woodwork effect”10 of HCBS 
provide contrary evidence. In an analysis of state-by-state Medicaid LTC spending for 1995–
2005, Kaye, La Plante and Harrington (2009) find that states offering extensive non-institutional 
                                                 
10 Woodwork effect is a colorful term for induced demand. It has two components: 1) More people will use publicly 
funded services if access to HCBS is expanded and 2) The additional beneficiaries will increase the growth rate of 
Medicaid expenditures.  
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services experienced growth in overall spending comparable to that in states offering lower 
levels of such services. Similarly, Eiken, Burwell and Sredl (2013) also concluded that there is 
no strong evidence that increased funding for HCBS has led to an increase or decrease in total 
Medicaid LTC expenditure.  
These results, however, are not based on multivariate regression methods and thus, do not 
provide a ceteris paribus effect of HCBS on Medicaid expenditures. Further, they examine the 
effect of HCBS spending in general and not the PCS State Plan option in particular. It is 
important to specifically investigate the effect of using the State Plan option because unlike 
1915(c) waivers, that are also a part of a state’s HCBS package, the State Plan instrument 
requires services to be provided state-wide to all eligibles who meet the functional need criteria. 
In other words, a state’s HCBS offering is a patchwork of various instruments that can have 
differing effects on overall expenditure and these mechanisms should therefore be analyzed 
separately.   
3.4 Methods 
This paper examines the effect of adopting a PCS State Plan option on aggregate 
Medicaid expenditures. Towards this, I estimate the following fixed effect model: 
 StatePlan  Waiver Zit it it it t i itM S                                           (1) 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the level of Medicaid expenditures for state i at time t; 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 is an indicator 
for the presence of PCS State Plan optional benefit in state i at time t. 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is an indicator 
variable for the presence of a personal care waiver in state i at time t.  𝑍𝑖𝑡  is a vector of 
economic, demographic and political variables; 𝛼𝑡 is a time-specific intercept (a vector of year 
dummy variables); 𝑆𝑖 is a state-specific intercept (a vector of state dummy variables); and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is a 
mean zero random error.    
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The results reported here are based on a semi-log model in which 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of 
expenditures in a given state and year. The state fixed effects capture all factors that are specific 
to a particular state and remain largely invariant over time. Such variables may include basic 
political and religious sentiments, and geographic characteristics. The year fixed effects capture 
factors that are common across all states in a particular year, such as federal policies (for 
example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), 1981 that authorized the waiver 
program) and major US Supreme Court decisions (for example the Olmstead ruling in 1999 that 
gave HCBS services a big push). Thus, the basic identification strategy implicit in this fixed 
effects approach purges the unobserved and potentially confounded cross-sectional heterogeneity 
by relying on within-state variations in PCS State Plan adoption over time, and by using those 
states that did not face changes in PCS State Plan adoption as a control for unrelated time-series 
variation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
3.5 Data 
The data used in this paper were collected from a variety of secondary sources. I describe 
these sources in detail below. Table 3-1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.  
3.5.1 State Medicaid Expenditures  
Aggregate Medicaid expenditures for each state were collected for the period 1975 
through 2009. The time series begins in 1975 because the option to provide PCS through a State 
Plan was first made available that year.  
In particular, I obtained Medicaid expenditures for each state for the period 1980-2009 
from the National Health Expenditure data provided by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS, 2015a). Medicaid expenditures for 1975 were extracted from a report prepared 
for the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (U.S. Congress, 1977). Medicaid 
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expenditures for 1976-1977 were extracted from reports prepared by Institute of Medicaid 
Management (Institute of Medicaid Management/U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, 1978, 1979). Finally, for 1979, state-by-state aggregate Medicaid expenditures were 
taken from an evaluation of the program conducted by the Urban Institute (Holahan, 1986). 
Because expenditure data for 1978 was unavailable from online sources, I averaged the 1977 and 
1979 numbers for each state to obtain approximate 1978 values.  
With 51 states spanning 35 years, there should ideally be 1785 observations. However, as 
Arizona did not have a Medicaid program for LTC for the first seven years of the study, there are 
a total of 1778 observations. All monetary values are in constant 2009 dollars and measure 
aggregate expenditure regardless of the share paid from state funds. 
3.5.2 PCS State Plan option 
Information on the presence of PCS State Plan Option across states was obtained from 
three sources: Simi and Litval (1991); Le Blanc, Tonner, and Harrington (2001) and Data 
updates on the Medicaid Home and Community Based Service Programs from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2011).  
Figure 3-1 shows a map of all adopting and non-adopting states by decade of adoption. 
Most states that eventually adopted the program did so by 1990. There appears to be a slight 
geographic clustering among non-adopters in the mid-west and southern parts of the country. 
Figure 3-2 presents the cumulative number of states with a PCS State Plan option in each year 
for the 1974-2009 period. The number of states with a PCS State Plan increased steadily from 
1975 until the late eighties.11 
                                                 
11 Delaware and Rhode Island were approved by CMS to offer personal care through their State Plan in 1999. 
However, it appears that they haven’t yet utilized the instrument because neither of the two states have ever reported 
any participants or expenditures for their PCS State Plans. For the purposes of this study, I code them as non-
adopters.   
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As indicated in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2, in the 1990s, very few states adopted the State 
Plan option. This number began to grow again after 1999, before starting to flatten in 2007. 
Kansas became the latest state to adopt the PCS State Plan benefit in 2007. No new state has 
adopted the program since then.  In addition, no state has dropped the PCS benefit from their 
Medicaid State Plan after having adopted it in a previous year. In 2009, a total of 32 states had 
adopted the PCS State Plan option. For the analyses in this paper, the PCS State Plan benefit is 
captured by an indicator variable which equals 1 if PCS State Plan benefit is present in a 
particular state during a certain year, and 0 otherwise. 
3.5.3 1915(c) waivers offering personal care 
  Beginning in 1981, states could provide personal care services through 1915(c) waivers. 
Because waivers are more flexible and allow easier targeting of benefits, some scholars have 
argued that states are increasingly relying on waiver programs to offer personal care services 
instead of adding the benefit to their State Plan (O’Keeffe, 2010). Further, it is likely that the 
correlation between waivers and Medicaid expenditures is not equal to zero. Thus, in order to 
avoid an omitted variable bias, it is important to control for the presence of a personal care 
waiver in a given state.  
Data on personal care waivers was obtained from the CMS website (2015b), which lists 
all waivers offered by every state. It also provides a description of each waiver, including the 
program’s approval date. States with waivers that included “personal care” or “personal support” 
services in the description were coded to have a personal care waiver. The approval date of the 
waiver was used as the start date of the program in the dataset.  To ensure comparability of 
services between waivers and the State Plan option, those waivers that only included 
“homemaker” or “chore services” were not coded as personal care waivers.  
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Figure 3-3 overlays the evolution of personal care waivers on PCS State Plan adoption. 
The graph indicates that by the late 1980s, the number of states offering personal care in at least 
one HCBS waiver grew rapidly. After 1987, the number of states offering personal care through 
waivers was more than the number of states that had adopted PCS State Plan option. At present, 
almost all states offer personal care through at least one active HCBS waiver.  
It is important to acknowledge that accurate data on HCBS waivers is notoriously 
difficult to collect because states often submit numerous amendments to their waiver programs. 
As a result, a state’s waiver portfolio can change considerably over time. The CMS website does 
not record these year-to-year changes in the description of waivers. To ensure accuracy of 
personal care waiver start dates, I corroborate the CMS data with that provided in Le Blanc, 
Tonner and Harrington (2001). This study details the presence of personal care waivers across all 
states during an earlier time period (1997-199). While some errors may still remain, it would be 
prohibitively expensive to gather all the information required to assess the complexity of every 
state’s program, especially over time. Further research will be necessary to determine how 
variation in the design, implementation and oversight of 1915(c) waivers relates to these current 
findings. 
3.5.4 Other Control Variables 
The empirical model controls for a series of political, economic and demographic 
variables likely to influence Medicaid expenditures. The political variables include an indicator 
for whether the state’s governor belonged to the Democratic Party. This was information was 
taken from the National Governors Association (2015). Additionally, to capture state generosity, 
I control for two other policy variables: 1) whether the state had a Medically Needy option12 and, 
                                                 
12 In some states, those individuals who do not meet a state’s income and asset eligibility limits may still qualify for 
Medicaid if they have significant medical expenses that reduce their income below a certain level, through what are 
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2) the amount of state supplement to the federal SSI benefit (in 2009 dollars).13 The data on the 
medically needy option across states is provided by David Grabowski from Harvard University 
(2013). State supplementation of SSI payments for 1975-1995 are gathered from Ponce (1996). 
Thereafter, information on this variable is taken from Urban Institute’s TRIM3 database (2012). 
Because these three political variables capture the construct of state generosity, it is expected that 
all three will lead to an increase in aggregate Medicaid expenditures.  
The economic variables include average state income (in 2009 dollars) and state 
unemployment rate. The state income is obtained from the Department of Commerce, U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (2015), and the state unemployment rate is obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2015). Higher incomes and lower unemployment rates may reduce the number 
of people eligible for Medicaid and thus, decrease Medicaid expenditures. On the other hand, 
some studies have also demonstrated that states with higher personal income tend to be more 
generous in their funding of Medicaid HCBS programs (Kane et al., 1998). Therefore, the 
direction of the effect is difficult to predict.  
The demographic variables cover a state’s total population and the proportion of elderly 
population (above age 65). Both these variables are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(2015). A large population suggests a greater number of eligible residents and therefore a higher 
level of Medicaid expenditures. Because LTC expenditures are a substantial part of overall 
Medicaid expenditures, a large elderly population is also expected to increase overall Medicaid 
expenditures. 
 
                                                 
called “medically needy” programs. All states have the option of covering so-called medically needy individuals, but 
not all do. 
13 SSI or Supplemental Security Income is a federal program that provides monthly cash payments to people in need. 
Some states add money to the federal benefit and this is known as state supplementation of SSI benefit. 
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3.6 Results 
Estimates from the fixed-effects regression are provided in Table 3-2. Overall, the results 
indicate that, at most, the adoption of PCS State Plan had a weak effect on aggregate Medicaid 
expenditures. While coefficient on PCS State Plan variable was positive, there was no 
statistically significant effect of PCS State Plan adoption on aggregate Medicaid expenditures. 
Further, even the statistically insignificant effect suggested a less than 5% increase in 
expenditures as a result of PCS State Plan adoption over the entire 35-year period.  
Turning briefly to other variables in the regression, I find that the presence of a personal 
care waiver leads to a decrease in Medicaid spending, though the effect is not statistically 
significant. It is possible that HCBS waivers reduce the number of individuals in nursing homes, 
thereby leading to a decrease in nursing home expenditures which still account for the largest 
share in overall Medicaid LTC expenditures. However, because the coefficient is not statistically 
significant, it is difficult to interpret the results substantively.  
A larger proportion of population age 65 and older was associated with higher Medicaid 
expenditures. Specifically, a 1% increase in this proportion was associated with a 0.79% increase 
in Medicaid expenditures. A larger population and a higher unemployment rate was also 
associated with an increase in Medicaid expenditures. The remaining variables in the model were 
not statistically significant.  
These findings were robust to a number of alternate model specifications (all robustness 
checks are available on request). First, it could be argued that there is some lag between PCS 
State Plan adoption and Medicaid expenditures. To test this argument, I ran versions of the 
model with one-period and two-period lags of the PCS State Plan variable included. Adding 
these lags had little effect on the PCS coefficient. 
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Second, unobservable characteristics in a state might change over time in ways that differ 
across states. Such characteristics could include changing demand for HCBS in a state. To test 
for this, I ran the model including state-specific linear time trends. This allows one to control for 
a slowly evolving change in tastes for HCBS across states. Including this control had no effect 
on the coefficient on the PCS variable.  
3.6.1 Effect of PCS State Plan over time  
The period 1975-2009 represents more than four decades of Medicaid HCBS evolution. 
To investigate how the effect of adopting PCS State Plan benefit on Medicaid expenditures 
changed over time, I interact the PCS State Plan variable with year dummies. I include the 
interactions as well as the main effects in the regression model. As in the previous case, robust 
standard errors are clustered by state.  
In this specification, the coefficient on the State Plan indicator (main effect) represents 
the effect of PCS State Plan in the baseline year (1975). To get the effect of PCS State Plan on 
Medicaid expenditures for subsequent years, I add the coefficient on the main effect and the 
coefficient on each State Plan–year interaction. Because this time series spans 35 years, I present 
the year-by-year effect of having a PCS State Plan on Medicaid expenditures in a graphical 
format (see Figure 3-4).  
The figure illustrates that for a brief period in the early years, the adoption of a PCS State 
Plan led to a statistically significant increase in aggregate Medicaid expenditures. Specifically, 
electing to cover personal care through a State Plan led to an as much as 20% increase in 
Medicaid expenditures in 1975 and 1982. Towards the end of 1980s, the effect of PCS State Plan 
began to decrease. After 1993, there was appears to be no effect of PCS State Plan on Medicaid 
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expenditures. This suggests that the overall positive effect of PCS on Medicaid expenditures 
mainly represents the effect of the program in the early growth years.     
The diminishing effect of PCS on Medicaid expenditures may be a result of a number of 
key changes that took place during the 1990s. These events are known to have markedly altered 
the Medicaid HCBS landscape in general. First, though initially introduced in 1981 under 
OBRA, it was the presidential administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush that saw an 
outpouring of 1915(c) waivers (Thompson and Burke, 2007). After waivers were introduced in 
1980s, officials were worried that states might use the 1915(c) instrument to open floodgates to 
greater Medicaid expenditures. To avoid that, the Office of Management and Budget imposed 
the “cold-bed” rule in the mid-1980s. This rule required states to demonstrate that for each 
HCBS waiver participant, it had emptied an institutional bed. As a result, states found it difficult 
to submit ambitious waiver proposals (Shirk, 2006).14 The Clinton administration ushered in a 
more hospitable climate for Medicaid waivers by eliminating the cold-bed rule (Thompson and 
Burke, 2007) in 1994, which consequently led to a rapid expansion of the program.15  
Second, as described above, starting in 1993 Congress made several revisions to the PCS 
State Plan benefit itself.  As a result of these changes made in federal policy, Keeffe et al. (2010) 
note that there remained little difference in the scope of personal are services that could be 
offered under the Medicaid State Plan and those that may be offered under an HCBS waiver.  
                                                 
14 According to Thompson and Burke (2007), during the 1980s, states often found negotiations with the federal 
bureaucracy over waiver approval to be arduous and protracted. For instance, it took Minnesota officials four years 
to obtain a federal sign-off on an HCBS waiver proposal, and Texas administrators three years. Delay frequently 
stemmed from differences between national and state officials over how to estimate the costs of the waiver. 
15 The growth in HCBS waivers during the 1990s does not contradict the graph presented in Figure 3-3. It is 
important to keep in mind that Figure 3-3 presents information on states having at least one HCBS waiver that 
offered personal care, and not the total number of waivers over time. 
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Thus, it is possible that with a rapid expansion of HCBS waivers in general, and the 
increasing degree of substitutability between waivers and the State Plan (in terms of the nature of 
services that could be offered through the two instruments), officials were able to combine the 
two options in such a way that the delivery of personal care through the State Plan vehicle 
became less expensive.  
This shift away from the PCS State Plan is evidenced in the literature as well. Between 
1992 and 2002, 1915(c) waiver program spending increased from 37% to 67% of the total 
Medicaid HCBS spending. On the other hand, spending for the PCS State Plan benefit dropped 
from 22% of total HCBS spending to 11% of total HCBS spending (Reester, Missmar and 
Tumlinson, 2004). Previous studies also suggest some decline in the services provided by states 
in their PCS State Plans. For example, from 1984 to 1988, there was a reduction in the number of 
states that provided respite and emergency services (Litval and Kennedy, 1991). In 1991, 
Michigan was known to have dropped from the program people who received purely chore 
services because they were solely state funded (Litval and Kennedy, 1991). Similarly, from 1999 
to 2002, the number of states that provided transportation services in their PCS State Plans also 
reduced (Kitchener, Ng and Harrington, 2007). There is also evidence that by 1988, fewer states 
had round-the-clock availability of personal care attendants (Litval and Kennedy, 1991). In 
addition, in 1984, about 70% of the PCS State Plans had specified service limits (cost or hourly 
caps) – by 1999, this number had changed to over 90% (Litval and Kennedy, 1991; Kitchener, 
Ng and Harrington, 2007). While a dummy variable approach to represent different PCS 
programs is useful in a study like this, further research needs to be carried out on how the content 
and design of these programs has changed over time.  
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3.6.2 Heterogeneous behavior in PCS State Plan adoption 
An important area of research in political science focuses on understanding the diffusion 
of policies across states. While most studies of this nature attempt to model whether the timing 
of policy adoption in a state is influenced by the policy adoption behavior of its neighbors, the 
theoretical mechanisms behind such adoption processes remain largely understudied (Hays and 
Glick, 1997; Mintrom, 1997). 
Diffusion theory is assumed to be based on a social learning process (Mooney, 2001). 
Social learning theory posits that state officials tend to draw on experience of other states (not 
necessarily neighboring states) when considering the adoption of a new policy. Information 
learned from another state can either enhance or diminish the chances of a polity adopting a law 
(Mooney, 2001). In other words, depending upon the policy, information learned from another 
state could have positive or negative effects on own adoption behavior.  
In this context, officials may find it relevant to learn from adopting states’ experiences on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of using the State Plan instrument to provide personal care 
services. That said, it is challenging to learn about effectiveness as state aggregate data on HCBS 
programs, participants, policies and outcomes are generally unavailable. One reason for this is 
that CMS does not have uniform reporting requirements across different HCBS programs 
(Harrington et al., 2009). On the other hand, states may find it relatively easier to learn from 
others on cost implications of adopting a PCS State Plan as expenditure data are widely 
available. 
If social learning plays a role in the diffusion of PCS State Plan adoption, then it is 
hypothesized that states attempt to predict changes in own expenditures based on the experience 
of other states, and decide to adopt the policy only if the predicted costs of doing so are low. 
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While there are many examples of states conducting feasibility studies before adopting a new 
policy, it is unclear if they use the experience of others states in this process.16 
In this section, I provide descriptive evidence on whether states display behavior that 
concurs with the theory of social learning. If, before making the decision to adopt a State Plan, 
states could predict cost changes associated with a hypothetical adoption (based on the 
experience of other states as well as their own characteristics), and if these predicted costs varied 
consistently with the eventual decision to adopt or not-adopt (that is, states with higher predicted 
costs were less likely to adopt in the future), then this represents suggestive evidence that states 
make policy decisions based on information that is gleaned from peers and adapted to their own 
situations.  
To do this analysis, I interact all control variables in equation (1) with the indicator 
variable for PCS State Plan. This enables each state to have a PCS State Plan-associated cost 
component that varies with individual state characteristics. I include all interactions and main 
effects in the model and save predicted expenditures from the fitted regression (Table 3-3).  
Next, I focus on all non-adopting states across different years. For these states, I save the 
predicted values from the above regression as “original predicted expenditure.” To impute the 
effect of a hypothetical State Plan adoption among these states, I change the value of the State 
Plan indicator variable from 0 to 1 and then re-calculate predicted expenditure using information 
from the same fitted regression. These new values of predicted expenditure are saved as 
“hypothetical predicted expenditure.” This represents predicted expenditures in a scenario where 
non-adopters hypothetically adopted a PCS State Plan. 
                                                 
16 Iowa is an example of a state that does not have a Personal Care Medicaid State Plan Option. They did an 
extensive study with recommendations to add the service but ultimately found the cost was too high (American 
Public Human Services Association/Center for Workers with Disabilities, 2006) 
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For these non-adopting states, I then calculate the difference between “hypothetical 
predicted expenditure” and “original predicted expenditure.” This difference is the “price” of 
PCS State Plan adoption to a non-adopting state in a given year. Next, I create a variable to 
indicate whether a state eventually adopts the PCS State Plan.  
Figure 3-5 illustrates the average “cost” of the PCS State Plan adoption among states that 
never adopt and those that are current non-adopters but eventually go on to adopt. The figure 
shows that during the 1980s, when having a PCS State Plan led to an increase in Medicaid 
expenditures, current non-adopters that never adopted the State Plan had a higher average cost of 
adoption in all years of the decade. In contrast, those non-adopters that eventually adopted the 
State Plan had lower average cost of adoption in all years of the decade.    
In other words, it is likely that states that never adopt the Plan do so because they face a 
high price of PCS adoption. Similarly, current non-adopters that eventually adopt do so because 
they face a relatively lower price of PCS State Plan adoption. This behavior appears to be 
consistent with the theory of social learning.    
3.7 Conclusion 
Though previous literature has claimed that adopting a PCS State Plan is likely to lead to 
large increases in spending, no study has empirically examined this question using longitudinal 
data. This paper represents the first effort to investigate the effect of the program on Medicaid 
expenditures from 1975 through 2009. It is also the first study that analyzes the development of 
the PCS State Plan since its inception in 1975 until 2009. 
I find that the adoption of a PCS State Plan led to an increase in Medicaid expenditures 
only during the early growth years of the program in the 1980s, and that this effect diminished 
over time. Specifically, averaging over the entire time period, as well as in individual recent 
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years, there is no statistically significant effect of PCS State Plan adoption on Medicaid 
expenditures. While high administrative costs may have contributed to an increase in 
expenditures during the early years of program implementation, the growth of 1915(c) waivers 
during the late 1980s and the 1990s likely played a role in enabling state officials to adapt by 
directing State Plan services and participants to waiver programs. A few scholars also note that 
there is less reason to be concerned about runway spending because Medicaid’s financial 
eligibility test – in particular the $2,000 asset limit in nearly all states – is particularly restrictive 
and has not been raised in nearly three decades. In other words, the restrictiveness of the asset 
test limits the number of people who can gain eligibility into the program (Borck et al., 2014).  
In general, the main message of this study is that over time, state officials have been able 
to adjust design elements of an entitlement program (within the constraints of the Medicaid law) 
in such a  way that it no longer influences overall expenditures. While this is positive news from 
a spending perspective, it does raise questions about the ability of the program to meet LTC 
needs of the population in its current form. Systematic evaluations of recipient outcomes need to 
be conducted to examine this question in greater detail.  
I also find suggestive evidence that states potentially learn from the experience of other 
states in order to make their own adoption decisions. In particular, non-adopting states that were 
predicted to have high costs of a hypothetical PCS adoption were less likely to adopt the benefit 
in the future as compared to those non-adopters that were predicted to have relatively low costs 
of such an adoption.  
A key limitation of this study is that a variety of secondary sources were used to collect 
information on Medicaid expenditures. This raises the possibility of measurement error which 
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can cause estimates to shrink towards zero. To the extent possible, future studies should attempt 
to collect data from unified sources.    
As the American population ages, the demand for LTC services is expected to surge. 
However, potential cost implications have remained a key stumbling block in the development 
and expansion of publicly provided formal care services like personal care. Targeted future 
research on the efficiency and quality of such programs needs to be conducted in order to gain a 
better understanding of how states tailor LTC services under the constraints of budgets, federal 
rules and state-specific policy objectives.  
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Figure 3-1 : PCS State Plan Adoption in the U.S. 
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  Table 3-1 : Descriptive Statistics 
State Level Variables Mean S.D 
Total Medicaid Expenditure (millions of 2009 $) 3257 5440 
PCS State Plan (Yes=1, No=0) 0.44 
1915(c) waiver that offered personal care (Yes=1, No=0) 0.57 
Democratic governor  (Yes=1, No=0) 0.55 
Medically needy (Yes=1, No=0) 0.69 
State supplement to SSI (2009 $) 53.61 104.58 
Personal per capita income (1,000s 2009 $) 29.06 9.3 
Unemployment rate (percent) 5.97 
Total Population (millions) 17.9 81 
Percent 65 and above 11.20% 
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Figure 3-2 : Cumulative Number of States with PCS State Plan 
 
 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
St
at
e
s
Year
PCS State Plan
81 
 
 
Figure 3-3 : Cumulative Number of States with PCS State Plan & 1915(c) waivers that provide personal 
care 
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Table 3-2 : Effect of PCS State Plan on Medicaid Expenditures 
  Ln Medicaid Expenditures      
PCS State Plan Adoption 0.04  (0.06) 
1915(c) waiver with personal care -0.07  (0.06) 
Ln total population 0.76 ** (0.19) 
Ln % population over 65 0.78 ** (0.18) 
Ln per capita income 0.32  (0.25) 
Ln unemployment rate 0.1 * (0.04) 
Medically Needy 0.06  (0.07) 
State supplement to SSI 0.0005  (0.00) 
Democratic Governor  0.01  (0.01) 
Constant  -9.17  (4.49) 
    
State Fixed Effects  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 1778 
Notes: Robust standard error cluster by state in parentheses. * Statistically significant at 5%; 
** Statistically significant at 1% 
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Figure 3-4 : Effect of PCS State Plan on Expenditures Over Time 
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Table 3-3 : Fixed Effects Regressions with Interactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Ln Medicaid Expenditures    
PCS State Plan Adoption 2.73 (1.33) 
1915(c) waiver with personal care 0.01 (0.08) 
Ln total population 0.77 (0.22) 
Ln % population over 65 0.78 (0.22) 
Ln per capita income 0.30 (0.27) 
Ln unemployment rate -0.07 (0.06) 
Medically Needy 0.07 (0.08) 
State supplement to SSI 0.00 (0.00) 
Democratic Governor  -0.02 (0.03) 
PCS*1915(c) waiver with personal care 0.06 (0.10) 
PCS*Ln total population 0.28 (0.17) 
PCS*Ln % population over 65 0.25 (0.17) 
PCS*Ln per capita income -0.32 (0.18) 
PCS*Ln unemployment rate 0.12 (0.08) 
PCS*Medically Needy -0.22 (0.08) 
PCS*State supplement to SSI 0.00 (0.00) 
PCS*Democratic Governor  0.05 (0.04) 
Constant -9.13 (4.48) 
   
State Fixed Effects  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 1778.00   
Notes: Robust standard error cluster by state in parentheses. Other control variables: PCS 
State Plan interactions with years dummies  
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Figure 3-5 : Cost of PCS Adoption for Non-Adopting states 
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